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Abstract 
Network neutrality – regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) to ensure equal 
treatment of all traffic – is becoming something many people have heard about. While 
the context is technical, network neutrality ultimately boils down to economics. The 
political weight of the subject is heavy, and the international debate is fierce. Still, 
surprisingly little rigorous research appears to be behind it. In this paper, I review 
economic literature on network neutrality and ISP regulation, covering both practical 
and theoretical implications for the broadband market. I define the degrees of network 
neutrality with more granularity than papers so far, evaluate the qualitative economic 
effects of regulation, and describe the broadband market, frameworks for modeling it, 
and its peculiar economic characteristics. In particular, I review and compare different 
theoretical modeling approaches and models’ predictions of the welfare effects of 
different regulatory regimes. Throughout the paper, I incorporate economic literature 
from relevant areas into the analysis. I do not make definite policy recommendations, 
but I draw conclusions that are potentially of interest from a policy point of view. 
My analysis would indicate that the complexity of the Internet ecosystem and 
interrelations between market participants make effective regulation difficult. There is 
no economic evidence that network neutrality generally increases total welfare. In fact, 
it turns out that from a well-rounded economic perspective, strong network neutrality 
appears in most cases as detrimental to both consumer surplus and total welfare. In 
certain scenarios, however, models predict that neutrality can increase static and 
dynamic efficiency. The results depend crucially on model specifications and 
parameters, which differ significantly across the literature. So far, there is no consensus 
among economists on the optimal level of ISP regulation. Market-driven solutions such 
as dynamic pricing might provide a way to circumvent the neutrality question. 
Keywords: network neutrality, broadband market, Internet service provider, 
telecommunications policy, welfare  
  
Tiivistelmä 
Verkkoneutraliteetti – teleoperaattorien sääntely tietoliikenteen tasa-arvoisen kohtelun 
varmistamiseksi – on astunut käsitteenä julkisuuteen. Vaikka konteksti onkin tekninen, 
verkkoneutraliteetti viime kädessä redusoituu taloustieteeseen. Aiheen poliittinen 
painoarvo on suuri ja kansainvälinen keskustelu kiivasta. Tästä huolimatta sen takaa 
vaikuttaa löytyvän yllättävän vähän tieteellistä tutkimusta. Lopputyössäni tarkastelen 
taloustieteellistä kirjallisuutta verkkoneutraliteetista ja teleoperaattorien sääntelystä ja 
sen vaikutuksia laajakaistamarkkinaan käytännöllisestä kuin myös teoreettisesta 
näkökulmasta. Määrittelen verkkoneutraliteetin asteet hienojakoisemmin kuin 
aikaisemmat julkaisut, arvioin sääntelyn laadullisia vaikutuksia ja kuvailen 
laajakaistamarkkinaa, viitekehyksiä sen mallintamiseksi sekä sen eriskummallisia 
taloudellisia piirteitä. Kuvaan teoreettisia lähestymistapoja ja merkittävimpien mallien 
ennusteita sääntelymallien hyvinvointivaikutuksista. Liitän analyysini relevanttiin 
taloustieteelliseen kirjallisuuteen. En anna suoria politiikkasuosituksia, mutta teen 
johtopäätöksiä, jotka ovat mahdollisesti mielenkiintoisia politiittisesta näkökulmasta. 
Analyysini perusteella vaikuttaa, että Internet-ekosysteemin monimutkaisuus ja 
toimijoiden väliset suhteet tekevät tehokkaasta sääntelystä vaikeaa. Taloustieteellistä 
näyttöä verkkoneutraliteetin hyvinvointia kasvattavista vaikutuksista ei ole. 
Tasapainoisesta taloudellisesta näkökulmasta katsottuna tiukka neutraliteettisääntely 
näyttää useimmissa tapauksissa sekä pienentävän kuluttajan ylijäämää että laskevan 
kokonaishyvinvointia. Joissakin skenaarioissa mallit toisaalta ennustavat neutraliteetin 
lisäävän staattista ja dynaamista tehokkuutta. Tulokset riippuvat rajusti mallin 
rakenteesta ja parametreistä, jotka vaihtelevat merkittävästi tutkimuksesta 
tutkimukseen. Toistaiseksi taloustieteilijät eivät ole päässeet yhteisymmärrykseen 
optimaalisesta teleoperaattorien sääntelyn asteesta. Markkinalähtöiset ratkaisut kuten 
dynaaminen hinnoittelu saattavat mahdollistaa neutraliteettikysymyksen kiertämisen. 
Avainsanat: verkkoneutraliteetti, laajakaistamarkkina, teleoperaattori, telepolitiikka, 
hyvinvointi
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1. Introduction 
[We] each pay to connect to the Net, but no one can pay for exclusive access to me. 
– Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the World Wide Web1 
I would like to begin by saying what this paper is not: A statement as to whether or 
not or to what degree “network neutrality” ought to be regulated.2 There are good 
arguments both ways – be they economic, technological, political, or ethical. In what 
follows, I aim for an objective, even if an economics-based analysis.3 
That being said, in this paper I analyze the potential effects of network neutrality, or 
rather, degrees of neutrality, from an economic point of view. Simply put, network 
neutrality (also “net neutrality” or “Internet neutrality” or the “Open Internet”) refers 
to the regulation of Internet service providers (ISPs) by requiring them to treat all 
traffic equally. The political weight of the subject is heavy, and the international debate 
is fierce. Still, surprisingly little rigorous research appears to be behind it all. I have 
chosen the research topic on the grounds that even with the ongoing developments, 
well-rounded economic analysis of ISP regulation remains scarce. Moreover, the modern 
broadband market in itself is somewhat sparsely studied in the economic literature. 
However, during the past decade, and especially the last few years, enough articles 
about the broadband market have been published so that some standard modeling 
frameworks have been established and a solid base for further research has been built. 
In addition, there is a range of surrounding literature applicable to the market in 
interesting ways. The contribution of my thesis to the existing stream of economic 
literature stems from the element of synthesis: I compare different economic approaches 
to network neutrality, define its forms with more granularity than papers so far, and 
present a review on the broadband market as a whole. While not making definite policy 
recommendations, I draw practical conclusions potentially of interest from a policy 
perspective. As developments in the field continue to unfold, I believe an up-to-date 
                                    
1 dig.csail.mit.edu. Accessed 29 Oct 2014. 
2 For a statement on the matter, see the President’s Statement: www.whitehouse.gov. Published and 
accessed 10 Nov 2014. 
3 Full disclosure: I thank Telealan edistämissäätiö for a scholarship toward this independent thesis. In 
the same vein, I thank my supervisor Mikko Mustonen for helpful comments. 
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review on the background, current state, and models of this economically fundamental 
industry – yet unfamiliar or even mysterious to many – is valuable as (an economist’s) 
common knowledge. Unfortunately, due to the broad ramifications of the neutrality 
question, limitations in the coverage of my particular study are unavoidable. My 
research questions are the following: 
i. How to model the broadband market and formulate an economic framework for 
policy analysis? 
ii. What peculiar economic characteristics does the broadband market exhibit, and 
how is the market developing? 
iii. What are the qualitative economic effects of network neutrality and alternative 
regulatory regimes? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the 
technological background of the broadband market and network neutrality, the forms 
of which I then proceed to define in detail. In Section 3, I describe the broadband 
market and characterize different economic forces at play in it. In Section 4, I analyze 
the potential implications of deregulation in light of these issues. In Section 5, I present 
theoretical modeling approaches and review the models’ predictions of the welfare 
effects of neutrality regulation. The majority of models specify a two-sided market with 
an ISP monopoly or duopoly, two or more content or service providers, and a 
continuum of Internet users. Finally, I discuss the policy implications. Throughout the 
paper, I incorporate extant economic literature into the analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Definitions 
The Internet is perhaps the most fundamental building block of the modern information 
society. According to an estimate, the emergence of broadband Internet has generated 
up to 50% of the US GDP in 1999-2006 (Greenstein and McDevitt 2011). Consequently, 
the regulation of ISPs is related to a myriad of big questions. While the context is 
technical, the network-neutrality debate ultimately boils down to economics. As Hazlitt 
and Wright (2012) put it, “Whatever the engineering designs of networks or the 
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interfaces between them, the terms of trade on which demanders and suppliers transact 
are economic. [...] They are the standard building blocks of markets: Property and 
contracts, layered upon a general legal regime enabling ownership, production, and 
trade.” The big questions related to network neutrality include economic welfare 
(efficiency, prices, surpluses), competition policy (vertical integration, price 
discrimination, bundling and tying), technological innovation (incentives to invest in 
technology), telecommunications engineering, digital and intellectual property rights, 
privacy, freedom of speech, censorship, and equality, among others. I elaborate on the 
economic aspects over the course of this paper. 
To establish a more cohesive framework for understanding the broadband market, a 
brief review on the technological background of the Internet and network neutrality 
might be justified. Then we can specifically define neutrality to be able to evaluate 
with consistency its meaning for the market. Additionally, I shed some light on why 
neutrality is debated in the first place, and summarize recent regulatory developments. 
2.1 Technical Preliminaries 
Logic of the Internet 
The Internet is a global network of private, public, commercial, academic, and 
government computer networks that has existed for about 20 years in the form we use 
it today. It was developed on top of the TCP/IP protocol from the US Department of 
Defense’s ARPANET dating back to the 1960s and the WWW protocol invented by 
Tim Berners-Lee’s at the turn of the 1990s. From the approximate 200 terabytes in 
1994, Internet traffic has grown to an estimated 600 exabytes in 2014 – a 30-million-
fold increase – and is expected to triple by 2018.4 While the technological specifics of 
the systems are outside the scope of this study, Figure 1 shows a schematic 
characterization of the Internet topology. 
                                    
4 Cisco Visual Networking Index 2014. Accessed 21 Dec 2014. 
  
4 K. Eerola / Aalto Uni. 
An end user connects from a computer (or mobile device) through the cables in the 
local loop (or wirelessly) to her residential ISP’s network. The local ISP providing the 
end user’s “last-mile” broadband Internet access then forwards the data to higher-level 
networks, operated by transit ISPs and carriers, from which the ISP has purchased 
transit access, ultimately through the Internet backbone to their destination. End users 
include both residential and business broadband users. Interconnect agreements 
between ISPs allow them to connect to each other and data to be transmitted between 
an end user’s computer and a content/service provider’s (CSP) server, or in the case 
of a peer-to-peer (P2P) connection, directly between end users. CSPs can be defined 
very broadly to include news sites, social media, online marketplaces, voice-over-IP 
(VoIP) applications, video and music streaming services, and any Internet content and 
services in between. 
The backbone comprises principal data routes, hosted at large commercial or public 
data centers with Internet exchange and network access points. Data are transmitted 
between the largest ISPs and carriers in “Tier 1” networks, where the operators use 
each other’s networks reciprocally as per the principle of peering. The principal data 
routes are optical (submarine) cables that carry virtually all the Internet traffic. Cables 
have been constructed and are operated by carriers and private telecommunications 
service providers (TSPs), from which ISPs lease capacity or purchase IRUs 
(indefeasible rights to use). As such, there are two layers of economic activity in the 
connectivity ecosystem: (1) Internet access provision by ISPs and (2) physical network 
operation by carriers (van Schewick 2007). 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Internet topology. In Tier 1 networks, ISPs 
engage in peering, i.e. they utilize each other’s networks reciprocally. Tier 2 ISP’s purchase 
access to Tier 1 networks (transit), but may also have peering agreements between each other 
(secondary peering). Tier 3 operators purchase access to Tier 2 and Tier 1 networks. Points of 
presence (PoPs) connect ISPs and CSPs to networks, and Internet exchange points (IXPs), 
some of which are publicly maintained (public peering vs. private peering), connect networks 
to each other. Adapted from “Internet Connectivity Distribution & Core,” user “Ludovic Ferre,” 
Wikimedia Commons, September 2014. 
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Routing of traffic on the Internet is a nontrivial problem. While the basic idea is that 
each router “maps” the surrounding network into a routing table and forwards each 
packet to the next hop toward the destination IP address, various economic, 
technological, and other private objectives are at play (Caesar and Rexford 2005). The 
transmission route of a packet is not always the one with the smallest hop count: The 
terms of interconnect agreements, revenue generation by transmitting through 
customer networks, and load balancing between networks influence the packet’s path. 
Another dimension of the Internet is its logical architecture as opposed to its 
geographical-topological structure described above. The Internet is usually treated in 
telecommunications engineering as a four-layer protocol suite. On the Internet, data 
streams are split into packets of roughly 1000 bytes (8000 bits). In packet switching, as 
opposed to circuit switching in GSM networks, multiple connections share the conduit 
simultaneously. The four abstraction layers are, from top to bottom, the application 
layer, transport layer, internet layer, and link layer. At the application layer, protocols 
such as HTTP standardize the interfacing methods and underlying protocols. At the 
transport layer, protocols such as TCP organize the transportation of the packets 
between users. The IP protocol at the Internet layer then specifies the structure of the 
packets themselves. The link layer comprises physical technologies, including Ethernet, 
for transmitting the bits and bytes within the packets between adjacent nodes in the 
network. 
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To simplify things a bit, it is enough for us to slice the system into three layers: (1) 
the content layer, (2) logical layer, and (3) physical layer (Ganley and Allgrove 2006). 
Figure 2 displays the logical structure of the Internet through these abstraction layers. 
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the Internet architecture. Within an 
application or a web site, a data stream is sent from User 1’s (or a CSP’s) computer to User 
2’s receiving computer. Packets are transmitted through physical pipes and organized using 
protocols at the logical layer. Adapted from “IP stack connections,” user “Cburnett,” Wikimedia 
Commons, January 2015. 
 
The Internet was designed to follow the so-called dumb-pipe principle. A “dumb pipe” 
refers to a network that has no intelligence of its own: It simply transmits bit streams 
as they come, treating each packet equally and not distinguishing between different 
types of data within packets. The dumb-pipe principle is closely related to network 
neutrality in the sense that no packet gets special treatment on the basis its content. 
Quality of Service 
Inherent to the Internet is a tradeoff between reliability and efficiency. The system is 
still not, nor will probably ever be, optimized for the latest commercial requirements. 
Scarcity of bandwidth is one of the central concepts in the economics of network 
neutrality. Bandwidth in the computer-networking context is defined as the net bitrate, 
channel capacity, or maximum throughput of a connection within a communication 
system. For our purposes, bandwidth can be simply thought of as the speed of the 
Internet connection. Since cables and routers in the networks have limited capacities, 
packets may need to be queued before they can be forwarded. Congestion occurs when 
the load is too high relative to the capacity, and quality of service (QoS) deteriorates, 
Logical
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Application
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i.e. the connection speed decreases and there is latency (delay), jitter (variation in 
latency), or packet loss. A computer at the edge of the network typically slows down 
its transmission rate if it detects congestion. Still, the ISP can and often will manage 
congestion from within the network. One way to alleviate congestion would be to slow 
down a set of data streams to allow room for the rest. Prioritization insofar as it is 
technologically necessary and not harmful to consumers is sometimes tolerated by 
regulators, vague as current legislation is. Clearly, another solution to congestion is to 
add capacity. For technological reasons, mobile broadband generally has lower speed 
and higher latency than fixed broadband. Lately, 4G technologies such as LTE-A have 
started to challenge and surpass fixed connections in speed if not latency. 
2.2 Network Neutrality 
The term “network neutrality” was coined by Tim Wu (2003). Network neutrality can 
be defined as follows. 
Definition. Network Neutrality (NN). The regulatory principle that all Internet traffic 
be treated by the ISP equally and without regard to content, source, or destination. 
More specifically, this leads to two corollaries. 
i. Demand-side neutrality: The ISP cannot discriminate or prioritize or filter5 
packets based on the origin, destination, or content. 
ii. Supply-side neutrality, i.e. the zero-price rule: The ISP cannot charge content 
and service providers a termination fee for access to its customers. 
As a prophylactic ex-ante rule, network neutrality contrasts with ex-post case-by-base 
regulation. It is compatible with ordinary user tiering, i.e. offering different bandwidth 
and QoS options to customers (Krämer et al. 2013). Data discrimination and 
termination pricing would often but not necessarily be interrelated. Crucially, the zero-
price rule only concerns the relations between residential last-mile ISPs and CSPs 
                                    
5 From here on, I use “discrimination” and “prioritization” interchangeably. I also reserve the right to 
use “neutrality” and “non-neutrality” quite liberally when the context so allows. Finally, I use “demand 
side” (“supply side”) or “retail market” (“wholesale market”) to refer to the end-user (CSP) side of the 
broadband market. 
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separate from each other, not the relations between directly interconnected ISPs and 
CSPs. While part of the Internet ecosystem, interconnection or access prices charged 
by Tier 1 or 2 ISPs to Tier 3 ISPs or by ISPs at the end of the network to CSPs are 
not the central target of neutrality regulation. Sizable settlements on direct 
interconnection points between CSPs and ISPs already happen (3.2). 
Degrees of Network Neutrality 
In most discussions and studies, network neutrality is treated as a straightforward yes-
no binary question or is vaguely defined. As Gans (2014) remarks, the reality is subtler. 
Gans classifies the degrees of network neutrality with more granularity than most 
papers, into (1) strong network neutrality where the ISP cannot discriminate in its 
prices to end users or CSPs, (2a) weak content-provider neutrality where the ISP cannot 
discriminate in its price to CSPs, (2b) weak consumer neutrality where the ISP cannot 
discriminate in its price to end users, and (3) no regulation. As it turns out, even this 
level of granularity can be insufficient. So far, I have defined a strict form of network 
neutrality, the NN regime. However, multiple degrees of regulation can be considered 
as natural generalizations of both parts of the NN definition. 
On the demand side, the first regulatory possibility is that no data discrimination or 
traffic shaping is allowed, with the exception of special circumstances such as illegal 
content. The second possibility is to allow the ISP to discriminate based on the traffic 
class such as voice or video, but not based on individual CSPs. For example, the ISP 
is allowed to prioritize voice over video, but not Skype over Google Hangouts. Under 
a laissez-faire policy, discrimination based on specific CSPs is also allowed. Bandwidth 
throttling and blocking, i.e. intentional slowing down or blocking of a traffic class or 
service even in the absence of congestion, can also be allowed. The prohibition of data 
discrimination without explicit regard to pricing practices is termed as a no-exclusivity 
rule by Kourandi et al. (2014). According to the rule, the ISP can charge CSPs 
termination fees but cannot contract with them on the exclusivity of content, i.e. sign 
exclusivity contracts. Content can be defined as exclusive when the ISP lets the content 
of only one or a few CSPs within a content class through to its end users, and denies 
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access to the rest. Finally, the ISP may be required to offer minimum QoS to end users, 
a neutral slow lane to end users, or a zero-price slow lane to CSPs (as analyzed in e.g. 
Economides and Hermalin [2012] and Peitz and Schuett [2013]). 
On the supply side, the zero-price rule is in effect a special case of price-cap regulation. 
Funnily enough, price caps as a generalized form of ISP regulation have been largely 
neglected in the literature. First, the regulator can cap the termination fee the ISP is 
allowed to charge CSPs. Alternatively, the termination fee must be set uniformly across 
CSPs without discrimination. Another alternative is to allow termination fees to differ 
across CSPs but require them to be “fair” by reflecting the given CSP’s data intensity 
and the ISP’s capacity provisioning costs. These considerations lead the regulator to a 
choice of a supply-side pricing policy in conjunction with a demand-side network policy. 
Recall that the ISP charging a termination fee is not generally the same one that 
provides upstream connectivity to the CSP. Rather, it is the local ISP, that is, the 
residential access ISP, which is in position to charge CSPs for last-mile access to end 
users. Figure 3 illustrates the relations between market participants. 
Figure 3. Structure of the broadband market. Under supply-side non-neutrality, the 
last-mile ISP can charge the CSP a termination fee (T) for access to its customers, in addition 
to charging end users a subscription fee (S) for Internet access. Depending on regulation, the 
termination fee may be negotiated between the ISP and CSP and may differ across CSPs. 
Under demand-side non-neutrality, the end user’s broadband connection and subscription fee 
may be differentiated based on QoS or access level (Section 4.1). The CSP generates revenue 
from membership fees (F) or, increasingly commonly, advertisements (A). Not shown in the 
figure are interconnection payments between ISPs or between the CSP and ISPs. 
 
Now what we have is a 3×3 matrix of possible combinations of discrimination and price 
regulation policies, amounting to a set of nine both discrimination and price regulation-
spanning regimes in total; Table 1 lists these regimes. Accounting for the alternative 
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and complementary network and pricing policies listed in the table footer, we end up 
with way over 100 theoretically possible regimes in total. To complicate things a bit, a 
whole another issue is how the policymaker finds an appropriate level for a price cap if 
it deems one socially beneficial. Alas, I cannot analyze the implications of all feasible 
regimes in detail. But I do discuss some of them in more depth along with methods for 
constructing more specific policy instruments later (Section 5.3), at which point we 
have the appropriate context for a policy analysis. 
Table 1. ISP regulation regimes. The table below cross-tabulates ISP regulation regimes 
with respect to the degree of freedom in prioritization and pricing. On one hand, the ISP may 
be allowed to (i) “manage” traffic based on the traffic class (video, audio etc.) or (ii) 
discriminate data based on the specific CSP (Netflix, Skype etc.). On the other hand, the ISP 
may be allowed to set freely (i) the subscription fee, (ii) termination fee, or (iii) both. Data 
discrimination is inclusive of traffic-class prioritization. Extensions to the regimes are listed 
below the table. Expanded upon Krämer et al. (2013). 
I have thus decomposed the neutrality question into two practically related but 
conceptually separate issues: Data discrimination and price capping. This contrasts 
Pricing Policy
 
Network Policy 
ISP Free to Set…? 
None Subscription Fee Subscription Fee + Termination Fee3 
ISP Free to 
Prioritize…? 
None Network Regulation (NR) 
Network Neutrality 
(NN) 
Network Regulation 
w/ Two-Sided Pricing4 
(NRT) 
Traffic 
Class1,2 
Network Management 
w/ Price Regulation 
(NMR) 
Network Management 
w/ Zero-Price Rule 
(NMZ)* 
Network Management 
w/ Two-Sided Pricing4 
(NMT) 
CSP1,2 
Data Discrimination 
w/ Price Regulation 
(DDR) 
Data Discrimination 
w/ Zero-Price Rule 
(DDZ) 
Network Non-Neutrality 
(NNN) 
1 Alternative network policies: (1) Throttling OK / (2) not OK (see remark next page) 
2 Complementary network policies: (i) minimum QoS; (ii) neutral slow lane for end users;
(iii) zero-price slow lane for CSPs 
3 Alternative pricing policies: (A) Discriminatory termination pricing: 
(a) unregulated termination fees; (b) “fair” termination fees reflecting ISP’s capacity 
provisioning costs; (c) non-zero termination fee cap; (d) total price cap on sum of subscription 
and termination fees 
(B) Uniform termination pricing: (a) uniform termination fee across CSPs, i.e. weak content-
provider neutrality (Gans 2014); (b) uniform termination fee with cap; (c) uniform termination 
fee with total price cap 
4 Regimes also referred to as “no-exclusivity rule” (Kourandi et al. 2014) 
* Closest to status quo 
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with treating the degrees of neutrality as price discrimination (cf. Gans 2014), a more 
general of an issue than broadband-market-specific. Technically, data discrimination 
can be considered either product differentiation or second-degree price discrimination. 
Hermalin and Katz (2007) treat neutrality as a product-line restriction (Section 5.1). 
For brevity, I refer to either product differentiation or price discrimination or their 
combination as “differential pricing.” 
One should in principle pay attention to the distinction between network management 
and throttling as defined earlier. The objective of network management is QoS 
optimization, and it should not harm consumers overall. Throttling is here taken to 
mean prioritization independent of the network congestion state. Surprisingly, most 
studies do not acknowledge this distinction between congestion-based and strategic 
prioritization. Throttling can be implemented at both the traffic-class and CSP levels. 
In practice, the distinction between congestion-based prioritization and throttling is a 
fine line. Data-discrimination regimes can be perhaps be assumed to imply throttling, 
for it is currently somewhat unclear if slowing down traffic from a particular CSP can 
be justified as a means of congestion avoidance. Such ambiguity disappears in the event 
of “paid prioritization” and exclusivity contracts, which are strategic in nature. At any 
rate, the distinction has regulatory implications and makes modeling more challenging, 
which is a natural reason for the lack of granularity in theoretical models. 
As one last technical remark, the traffic-class and CSP-level data discrimination 
regimes can be observed to correspond to the abstraction layers from Section 2.1. Under 
the network-management regimes, the ISP can use prioritization techniques at the 
logical layer for congestion avoidance and network optimization, but under data-
discrimination regimes it can also apply content-layer prioritization. Neutrality at the 
logical layer is thus equivalent with the dumb pipe principle. While most discussions 
have concerned content-layer prioritization, it has been argued6 it is actually lower-
layer prioritization that endangers the dump-pipe nature of the Internet and can 
indirectly lead or has already led to deliberate and systematic discrimination of certain 
                                    
6 Network Neutrality. p2pfoundation.net. Accessed 16 Nov 2014. 
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applications and, consequently, users based on their traffic profiles. With the constant 
evolution of the system, deviations from the pure dumb-pipe architecture are emerging. 
Protocols now specify the DiffServ (“differentiated services”) packet header field that 
allows for traffic management based on the QoS requirements of data streams. The ISP 
might still use methods overriding DiffServ-based priority designation, as it is up to 
the CSP at the edge of the network to implement and hence not directly controlled by 
the ISP. 
Status and Developments 
If the definition of network neutrality is tricky, its legal status is perplexing; I cannot 
cover it comprehensively here. The status quo is somewhere between the NN and NMZ 
regimes in Table 1. Hitherto, no widespread, explicit, CSP-level data discrimination 
and no termination fees has been the de facto policy in the broadband markets. 
Compared to telephone network operators,7 ISPs are not generally regulated as strictly, 
and termination fees are largely unregulated (Vogelsang 2014). In the EU, ISPs are 
regulated mainly by national authorities, and in the US by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). In Finland, fixed broadband 
providers need not obtain an operating license.8 The broadband market is not widely 
price regulated, with some notable exceptions. In Germany, the broadband market is 
ex-ante cost-basis regulated and in Austria retail-minus wholesale-regulated (Götz 
2013). As far as data discrimination goes, “network management,” “bandwidth 
management,” or “traffic shaping” is something ISPs already do to a degree. Disclosure 
and transparency of these practices is increasingly required.9 Some regulators have 
enforced vertical separation on a case-by-case basis (Jamison 2012). Authorities can 
generally try to control the market ex post through competition laws. In particular, 
“unfair” exclusion of content or termination pricing by an ISP with a high degree of 
market power could possibly fall under Article 102 in EU competition law, which 
includes, for example, setting unfair prices and “applying dissimilar conditions to 
                                    
7 The EU regulates roaming charges, i.e. termination fees, between telephone operators. 
8 Communications Market Act. Ministry of Transport and Communications, Finland, 2011. 
9 Directive 2002/22/EC. 
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equivalent transactions with other trading parties” (cf. price discrimination) in its 
definition of abuse of a dominant position. 
A Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and 
European Commission investigation report10 paints a rather interesting picture of the 
state of traffic prioritization in EU-area broadband markets. BEREC and the 
Commission found that at least 21% of fixed broadband users and 36% of mobile 
broadband users in EU markets are affected by P2P throttling or blocking, and at least 
21% of mobile broadband users are affected by VoIP throttling or blocking. At least 
Vodafone and Telefonica have planned to deviate from the zero-price rule.11 US ISPs 
have been publicly suspected of discriminating traffic, most prominently retail market 
leaders Comcast and Verizon. Comcast has been accused of throttling BitTorrent and 
VoIP traffic; Verizon has been blamed for specifically discriminating Netflix and 
Amazon cloud service traffic.12 Traffic prioritization, while not necessarily explicit, and 
in most cases of the low-level variety, would appear to be a very real phenomenon. 
In response to an increasing exposure to non-neutrality during the past few years, 
countries have started to come up with legislation packages targeted to uphold 
neutrality. While still not explicitly enforced at the EU level,13 and while EU member 
states’ legislations are not harmonized, neutrality has entered the EU legislative 
agenda. Directive 2002/22/EC classifies Internet access as a “universal service.” The 
relevant EU legislation was updated in 2009 when the Telecoms Package was adopted, 
and has ever since given member countries the power to specify minimum QoS 
requirements for broadband. Finland was the first one to jump the wagon in October 
                                    
10 BEREC BoR (12) 30. A View of Traffic Management and Other Practices Resulting in Restrictions 
to the Open Internet in Europe. BEREC report, 2012. 
11 www.telecoms.com. Accessed 11 Oct 2014. 
12 www.nbcnews.com. Accessed 8 Oct 2014. For a more comprehensive look into what sorts of 
“manipulation” ISPs have been accused of, see e.g. wikipedia.org. 
13 Directive 2009/136/EC reads: “[ISPs must] inform subscribers of any change to conditions limiting 
access to and/or use of services and applications, where such conditions are permitted under national 
law in accordance with Community law.” 
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2009.14 The Netherlands was the first EU country to go all the way to enact neutrality 
regulation in 2011. The EU legislation was to be updated again after the Commission 
voted in favor of an amendment package15 that outlaws throttling and blocking and 
was expected to become effective in 2015. In March 2015, the European council decided 
to reassess the rules amid proposals to allow prioritization of “specialized” services with 
high QoS requirements.16 
In the US, the FCC has traditionally taken more of an ex-ante approach to ISP 
regulation (Shin 2014). An interpretation of a 2010 court ruling17 is that bandwidth 
throttling, blocking, or discrimination is not allowed in the presence of other viable 
means of dealing with congestion. Later in 2010, the FCC established a set of 
regulations approaching neutrality with the FCC Open Internet Order 2010, which (a) 
enforced transparency and (b) outlawed blocking and “unreasonable” discrimination. 
An eye-catching “detail” in the Order was that the second part of the order only applied 
in to fixed, not mobile broadband connections (Hazlett and Wright 2012; Maxwell and 
Brenner 2012). The regulatory momentum in the US was reversed after a 2014 court 
ruling that rejected the FCC’s authority to apply the latter part of the order to ISPs, 
as they are classified under information services rather than common carriers.18 In May 
2014, the FCC launched a public comment period that garnered comments on ISP 
regulation from four million people. US President Barack Obama subsequently made 
an official statement to the FCC urging it to place ISPs under Title II of the 
Communications Act of 1934,2 which would reclassify both fixed and mobile broadband 
as a telecommunications service and effectively preserve neutrality, viz. ban blocking 
and throttling. A milestone was reached in February 2015 when the FCC voted in favor 
of new regulation guidelines, grounded in Title II, outlawing paid prioritization.19 
However, space is given to network management, which means that gray areas may 
                                    
14 Decree of the Ministry of Transport and Communications on the minimum rate of a functional Internet 
access as a universal service (732/2009). 
15 Connected Continent legislative package. Accessed 17 Sept 2014. 
16 www.wired.co.uk. Accessed 7 March 2015. 
17 Comcast Corp. v. FCC: 600 F. 3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 08-1291 (2010). 
18 Verizon v. FCC: 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); 11-1355 (2014). 
19 FCC’s Open Internet rules. www.fcc.gov. Accessed 26 Feb 2015. 
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remain in the legislation. In any event, the matter is far from settled, lawsuits have 
already been filed by ISPs, and the debate shows no signs of calming down in the near 
future. 
The Debate 
The network-neutrality debate has become fierce over the last years, in the US in 
particular. By now, it is a soup of emotions, confusions, and misinterpretations. As Zhu 
(2007) noted already years ago, “[T]he legal community originated and popularized the 
debate, which has since fallen victim to political and ideological polarization. […] If the 
industry giants and Congress were actually neutral to this “neutrality” debate, they 
should have found a middle ground by now. If legal scholars understood the 
technicalities of the internet, they could have reached that middle ground as well.” 
Why is there such a heated debate on neutrality in the first place? The answer is at 
least fourfold. The stakeholders are numerous, but include above others (1) ISPs, (2) 
CSPs, (3) end users, i.e. the majority of developed countries’ population, and (4) the 
regulator. This means differing and conflicting interests. 
ISPs. Deregulation has been suggested to give rise to financial gains to ISPs. The 
potential benefit to ISPs is thought to come from paid prioritization, that is, 
prioritization of affiliated and sponsored content over other content. Deregulation 
would also create new possibilities for differential pricing. Some ISPs have said they 
have no plans to implement paid prioritization.20 In general, ISPs have vouched for 
deregulation, although not necessarily to the fullest extent. For example, a legislative 
framework proposal by Google and Verizon would allow for low-level discrimination 
(cf. Table 1), i.e. “network management” based on the traffic class, and high-level 
discrimination in the case of wireless connections (cf. the Open Internet Order).21 The 
main argument by ISPs in favor of prioritization is technological: Due to the explosive 
growth of traffic, network optimization is required to maintain QoS and deliver a better 
customer experience. Moreover, ISPs maintain that regulation prevents them from 
                                    
20 Verizon response to US Senate. publicpolicy.verizon.com. Retrieved 3 Nov 2014. 
21 googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com. Accessed 1 Nov 2014. 
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recovering their infrastructure costs. ISPs have also proposed that revenue or cost 
savings from prioritization be used toward new infrastructure, eventually benefiting 
consumers. Lately, Google, which is rolling out its Fiber broadband service, has 
reportedly started to support Title II regulation because it would give the company 
access to utility infrastructure such as local phone and cable lines.22 
CSPs. Many CSPs and Internet application companies are neutrality proponents.23 The 
aforementioned benefit from non-neutrality to ISPs is seen to come at a cost to CSPs, 
which would possibly have to not only pay a base termination fee but also compete to 
secure a competitive access to customers. The “gatekeeper” positions of ISPs could even 
enable them to auction off access to customers and extract much of the CSPs’ surplus 
in the process. This would threaten the development of the content markets. 
End users. There is no general-public consensus on the neutrality matter. Among many 
of those who support neutrality, there is a fear that the deregulated Internet experience 
would look nothing like today’s Open Internet. The dystopia has been characterized as 
a “Tiered Internet,” an Internet where ISPs have the power to provide tiered broadband 
services with different levels of access to the Internet. This could result in Internet 
“fragmentation” (Section 4.2), where end users end up isolated from each other due to 
differentiated access to the net as per ISPs’ exclusivity contracts with CSPs. Allowing 
data discrimination could result in this sort of tiering or versioning. Subsequently, there 
are concerns about digital and intellectual property rights (freedom to share and reach 
content), privacy (“deep-packet inspection,” eavesdropping), freedom of speech and 
censorship (filtering out content), and equality (customer discrimination). 
Despite the ongoing debate, it is also probable that the majority of end users are 
uninformed about the concept of neutrality to begin with. A 2014 online survey 
                                    
22 blogs.wsj.com. Accessed 2 Jan 2015. 
23 Support for net neutrality has been most visibly demonstrated by the “Save the Internet” and “Battle 
for the Net” initiatives. An Internet Slowdown Day was organized on 10 September 2014, during which 
CSPs and software firms including Netflix, Reddit, Mozilla, Vimeo, and Tumblr slowed down their 
services or displayed a symbolic “loading” symbol on their websites. 40,000 sites reportedly participated. 
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indicates that 58% of US users are uninformed, 22% support neutrality, and 20% oppose 
it.24 A natural language processing analysis of millions of comments during the FCC 
public comment periods would indicate that, excluding one libertarian group’s million 
anti-neutrality letters, over 99% of individual comments were pro-neutrality25 – 
selection bias is probable, however. A Google Trends analysis would indicate that the 
number of informed users has spiked in November 2014 and again in February 2015, 
with most informed users residing in the US and Canada; most informed European 
users are located in the UK, the Netherlands, and Germany.26 
The regulator. In theoretical terms, the regulator can be seen as a social planner aiming 
to maximize total welfare. However, the regulator is also interested in the allocation of 
welfare and who the gainers and losers are under different regulatory regimes. In 
addition to static efficiency, the regulator has to contemplate the incentive effects and 
dynamic consequences of regulation. In practice, the policymaker uses more mundane 
arguments. The European Commission motivates neutrality regulation in support of 
the openness of the Internet and in prevention of (1) unfair traffic management 
practices, (2) weakening of the competition, (3) decline of innovation, and (4) potential 
degradation of QoS.27 “Unfair traffic management practices” refer to (paid) 
prioritization. 
3. Description of the Broadband Market 
In this section, I describe the economics at play in the broadband market. I start by 
laying out some basic notions related to modeling the market. I try to focus on the 
broadband market rather than cover online markets in general (who could?). I discuss 
inter-ISP relations on the supply side, interrelations between ISPs and CSPs, and the 
supply and demand for Internet content insofar as these might affect the retail market. 
                                    
24 www.google.com. Accessed 18 Dec 2014. 
25 sunlightfoundation.com. Accessed 30 Dec 2014. 
26 www.google.com. Accessed 4 Jan 2015. I use web searches for “net neutrality” as a proxy for the 
fraction of informed users. 
27 Net Neutrality challenges. ec.europa.eu. Accessed 18 Oct 2014. 
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In Sections 4 and 5, then, I evaluate the effects of regulation in light of the 
characteristics of the broadband market. 
3.1 Modeling the Market 
I start by briefly presenting some fundamental concepts typically used in modeling the 
broadband market and, subsequently, the economic effects of network neutrality: (1) 
two-sided markets, (2) queueing systems, and (3) a natural monopoly, duopoly, and 
oligopoly. 
Two-Sided Markets 
The broadband market is a two-sided market in which two groups connect via a 
platform. The ISP maintains the platform, namely, Internet connectivity, which end 
users and CSPs use to interact with each other. The reader can refer back to Figure 3 
for the structure of the broadband market, with the ISP lying in between end users 
and CSPs. In addition to broadband, other two-sided markets include operating 
systems, credit cards, shopping malls, gaming consoles, and stock exchanges (Rochet 
and Tirole 2006; Rysman 2009). Two-sided markets are characterized by dependence 
of parties upon a platform and by network effects (or “network externalities” or “group 
externalities”), in the presence of which the value of the platform to a user depends on 
other users (Armstrong 2006; Rysman 2009). The relative sizes of the group 
externalities affect the prices the platform operator charges at each side. The positive 
network externalities associated with telecommunications networks can be used as an 
argument for promoting universal service (Sidak 2006), at which public policies such 
as the Finnish “Broadband 2015” plan aim. The platform, e.g. a credit card, allows the 
seller and consumer to conduct the transaction and only has value if it is widespread 
enough. 
Two-sided pricing or “double charging” is common in two-sided markets, but sometimes 
the platform does not find it optimal (Economides and Hermalin 2012). MasterCard 
charges merchants for each transaction but gives benefits to cardholders. On the other 
hand, Google Play taxes both the users and app developers by pocketing 30% of sales 
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revenue.28 In this light, termination fees by ISPs would not seem that out of place. 
Platforms in a two-sided market may enjoy special attention from the regulator 
concerned about customer discrimination; an example analogous to throttling by ISPs 
is the recent court case against Visa and MasterCard following their blocking of 
payments to Wikileaks.29 
While two-sided markets have been relatively widely studied, research in the particular 
context of the broadband market is still rather sparse. In addition to the 
aforementioned papers, notable works on the mechanics of two-sided markets include 
Amelio and Jullien (2012), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Eisenmann et al. (2006), Hagiu 
(2006), Parker and van Alstyne (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003), and Weyl (2010). 
The interconnectedness of ISPs differentiates broadband from other two-sided 
platforms, as the customers (CSPs) directly connected to one platform (ISP) get access 
to all platforms (Musacchio et al. 2009). Under non-neutrality, this does not necessarily 
apply. 
Queueing Systems 
The broadband market is a peculiarity among two-sided markets also due to the 
existence of congestion (Economides and Hermalin 2012). Internet networks are 
essentially queueing systems. In most of the network neutrality studies, congestion in 
the network is modeled in some more or less mathematical form. The ISP’s capacity 
provisioning, costs, and economic behavior depend on the demand for bandwidth at a 
given time; demand for bandwidth in turn is reflected as data streams and packets in 
the system. Congestion can be costly, and the ISP will generally act to avoid it. Most 
models specify a monopolistic or representative ISP, whose networks can most 
abstractly be treated as a single pipe that forwards packets. The simplest approach is 
to model the network as an M/M/1 queue with only one server (router). Customer 
(packet) arrival times follow a Poisson process, i.e. waiting times are exponentially 
distributed. The server uses the FIFO policy, where packets are forwarded in the order 
                                    
28 google.com. Accessed 13 Jan 2015. 
29 rt.com. Accessed 13 Dec 2014. 
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they arrive (cf. the dumb pipe). The number of packets in the system (in the trillions 
or so) is then a stochastic process with state space {0, … ,݊ − 1, ݊, ݊ + 1, … }, which can 
be normalized with respect to some reference state. Most neutrality studies employ the 
M/M/1 specification. One can generalize the M/M/1 system to e.g. the M/M/c system, 
where c denotes the number of servers, or all the way to the G/G/k system, where 
arrival and service times have arbitrary distributions. Continuous, real-valued analogs 
to queueing processes are studied in the field of fluid models. In a broad context, these 
sorts of models are not usually worth the extra complexity, and hence not germane to 
the analysis. Figure 4 illuminates the logic of the M/M/1 system. 
Figure 4. M/M/1 queueing system. The system consists of a queueing node with a waiting 
area (top left) and a service node (top right), and evolves according to the state transition 
diagram (bottom). At a given moment, there are ݊ customers/packets in the system. ߣ is the 
mean arrival rate and μ is the mean service rate; similar notation is usually used in network 
neutrality models. Hence, ߣ/μ ≡ ߩ is the utilization rate of the server (load), ߣ/(μ − ߣ) ≡ ത݊ is 
the expected number of packets in the system, ߩ ത݊ ≡ ܮ is the expected queue length, 1/(μ −
ߣ) ≡ ܹ is the expected total time spent in the system, and ߩܹ ≡ ݓ is the expected waiting 
time. Congestion occurs if, for some time span, ߣ > μ, i.e. load exceeds capacity and packets 
start to accumulate in the waiting area. Figure sources: Users “Gareth Jones” and “Tsaitgaist,” 
Wikimedia Commons, December 2014. 
 
In the language of economics, modeling the network as a queueing system means 
treating the demand for bandwidth stochastically and incorporating congestion into 
the model. Congestion-inclusive frameworks can also describe regimes where throttling 
is not allowed, i.e. traffic is only prioritized in response to congestion. Models differ in 
whether the ISP is bound by a capacity constraint. Typically, the capacity of mobile 
networks is lower than that of fixed networks. Choi et al. (2014) in particular make 
this explicit in their model. 
Assuming deterministic demand and no congestion can be insufficient for a realistic 
model; congestion, demand volatility, and uncertainty are essential features of the 
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broadband market. A subsequent question is how to model the subjective disutility to 
the customer from waiting. Traditionally this delay cost has been assumed constant 
(Afèche 2006). (It can be argued that this is not realistic; perhaps after a certain waiting 
time disutility begins to increase faster.) Krishnan and Sitaraman (2012) estimate that 
after a two-second startup delay, each one-second delay increment increases video 
stream abandonment rates by 5.8%. Maister (1985) provides more insight into the 
psychology of waiting lines, very well applicable to virtual ones. Kleinrock (1967) shows 
that the optimal bribe – the extra payment for a “priority lane” to reduce the waiting 
time – is monotonically increasing in the customer’s “impatience factor” for all Poisson-
arrival single-server queues. 
Natural Monopoly, Duopoly, and Oligopoly 
Due to substantial economies of scale (quantity produced) and scope (product mix), 
telecommunications networks are often considered a natural monopoly. Natural 
monopoly can be defined as a scenario in which 
 ܥ(ܳ) <  ܥ(ݍଵ) +  ܥ(ݍଶ)+ . . . + ܥ(ݍ௞), (1)
where ܥ(ܳ) is the cost of producing output ܳ ≡ ∑ ݍ௜௞௜ୀଵ  of a homogenous good (Joskow 
2007). Thus, in the case of a homogenous good, the situation falls under this definition 
of a natural monopoly whenever there are economies of scale over a relevant range of 
total output. A broadband connection is not far from a homogenous good, although it 
can be differentiated in speed or price or be bundled with other services. Much more 
differentiation would be possible under non-neutrality. It should be recognized that 
there are alternative approaches to defining a natural monopoly. In any case, in the 
same way than with highways or power transmission lines, it usually makes no 
economic sense to firms to build two next to each other. Even though there is 
competition at the macro level, locally the end user’s alternatives are limited, especially 
so in periphery areas. 
Most natural monopolies are regulated in some ways. The firm may also be state-
owned. Monopolies or dominant firms are closely monitored by competition authorities 
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for abuse of a dominant position, defined in Article 102 in EU legislation. The argument 
for natural-monopoly regulation can be condensed into prevention of socially costly 
market failures that arise from the poor economic performance of naturally 
monopolistic industries (Joskow 2007). In general, industries that exhibit natural 
monopoly characteristics, such as the broadband market, tend to become concentrated. 
Then, the usual warnings against a monopoly and weak competition apply. The policy 
instruments in turn are heterogeneous. The regulator can control prices, entry, and 
terms and conditions of service through price or profit ceilings and floors and operating 
licenses. Price regulation is often cost-based, and pricing may be either linear or 
nonlinear. One can set either ܲ = ܣܥ (linear pricing) or ܲ = ܯܥ plus fixed fee ܵ 
covering fixed costs (two-part tariff). In the telecommunications industry, ܵ would 
represent a large fraction of the total tariff. Subject to a break-even constraint, Ramsey 
pricing (Ramsey 1927) gives the socially optimal price choice for the monopolist: 
 ܲ − ܥ
ܲ
= ߣ1 + ߣ 1ߝ , (2)
where ߣ is the shadow cost and ߝ is the price elasticity of demand. Hence the optimal 
price is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. The theoretical optimality 
of Ramsey prices would also apply to a monopolistic upstream Tier 1 or 2 ISP when 
downstream competition is perfect (Vogelsang 2003). As we know, it is usually not, in 
which case optimal pricing becomes more elaborate. 
Another cost-based regulation scheme is a “yardstick”-based price cap (Shleifer 1985), 
where firm ݅ sets 
 ݌௜ = 1ܰ − 1෍ ௝ܿ
௝ஷ௜
, (3)
where ܰ is the number of locally monopolistic firms and ܿ ௝ is firm ݆’s marginal cost. In 
words, the optimal price is equal to average marginal cost to other firms operating in 
the same product market, acting as a cost benchmark. The most obvious challenge in 
cost-plus regulation schemes is incentivizing firms to keep costs in line. Cost-frontier- 
and performance-based incentive regulation schemes have been devised to this end, 
  The Economic Effects of Network Neutrality 23 
where cost leaders act as the benchmark instead of a simple industry average. A quite 
complex derivative of the yardstick principle is the revenue-cap benchmark regulation 
of Finnish electricity distribution firms. 
When not monopolistic, broadband markets usually exhibit oligopolistic characteristics. 
Oligopolies, as potentially dominant firms, are monitored in the EU under Articles 101 
and 102; Article 101 outlaws collusion, tacit or explicit. The two main theoretical 
approaches to modeling oligopolies are Cournot (quantity) competition and Bertrand 
(price) competition. Through an undercutting argument, Bertrand competition with 
only two firms can be seen to lead to an equilibrium with prices equal to those in 
perfect competition. In very general terms, the Cournot (Bertrand) model is the 
suitable one when capacity adjustment is difficult (easy). In the short run, ISPs can 
purchase transit and make small-scale capacity adjustments; large-scale infrastructure 
investments can take years. Since with both models a duopoly setting yields results in 
most cases easily generalizable to an oligopoly with ܰ firms, a duopoly is the most 
popular alternative to a monopoly in broadband market models. It is also quite realistic 
in our context. In some models the game is of the Stackelberg type, where one firm 
makes its move first. The Cournot and Bertrand models can also be used concurrently, 
as is in a sense done in e.g. Njoroge at al. (2009), where two ISPs first set quality 
(“quantity”) levels and then compete in prices. Quality can be taken to mean QoS, i.e. 
features such as the connection speed, or, in the non-neutral world, access level. In 
general, dynamic games such as the Stackelberg game can be solved by finding the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPE), most commonly using backward induction. 
Particularly popular in the broadband-market context is the Hotelling (1929) model, 
in which firms are located on a line, construed to reflect either the geographical location 
or product characteristics. The setting can be monopolistic, monopolistic competition, 
duopolistic, or oligopolistic. A continuum of consumers is uniformly distributed on the 
line, again reflecting either a geographical map or a “preference space.” Firm and 
consumer locations can be thought to reflect product properties and preferences, 
respectively. The unit “transportation cost” from moving along the line can be taken 
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to reflect the degree of product differentiation (Choi and Kim 2010). In a non-neutral 
network, an ISP’s location might reflect the particular content offering its broadband 
connection enables consumers to reach. The Hotelling formulation is applied in some 
form in most of the mathematical neutrality-related models. 
3.2 Market Structure 
The underlying supply-chain structure of the broadband market can be seen to be 
reminiscent of other markets with manufacturers (CSPs), wholesalers (transit ISPs and 
carriers), and retailers (residential ISPs) (Yoo 2006b). As described earlier, the market 
has the tendency to be locally monopolistic or oligopolistic. The barriers to entry are 
high due to the high upfront investment cost. In most legislations, in the EU in 
particular, the local loop is unbundled: ISPs share last-mile access from the local 
exchange point to the end user’s premises and are free to compete for broadband 
provision to the user. Alternatively, the incumbent ISP can grant entrants bit-stream 
access to its equipment installed at the end user’s premises – a “handover point” this 
low in the topological hierarchy is not mandated at the EU level, however (Leal 2014). 
It has been argued that mandatory unbundling facilitates competition, but this is not 
always true, as the incumbent ISP can still control much of the local traffic, and having 
to share access can hinder incentives for market entry (Cambini and Jian 2009; 
Hogendorn 2007; Wallsten and Hausladen 2009). Indeed, a rule of thumb is that an 
end user has one to three ISPs to choose from. A handful of large ISPs sometimes enjoy 
substantial market power in a geographically vast market area. 
Characteristic to the broadband and inter-ISP markets has been a strong hierarchy. 
While local ISPs may have significant market power over end users, larger transit ISPs 
and backbone carriers may have significant power over local ISPs, which have to 
purchase network access from them. Traditionally, access prices in the EU and US have 
been cost-based with small common markups (Vogelsang 2006) and are regulated in 
some areas (Bourreau and Lestage 2013). Still, small players may not have much 
negotiation leverage. The situation is referred to as the one-way access problem 
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(Armstrong 2002; Vogelsang 2003). Figure 5 delineates this kind of a market structure. 
During the last years, however, the industry has started to evolve toward a “mesh,” 
with also smaller ISPs directly connecting between each other (Besen and Israel 2013). 
Power over of the principal data routes remains concentrated nonetheless. 
Figure 5. One-way access problem. A monopolistic upstream network operator provides 
network access to smaller downstream operators that in turn provide the final services. The 
monopolist may be vertically integrated and provide final services directly in the retail market. 
Source: Access Pricing in Telecommunications. OECD Competition Committee report, 2004. 
 
Large ISPs can be vertically integrated in two senses of the term. On one hand, the 
same firm can operate both as a local residential ISP and as a global carrier. In the 
US, AT&T and Verizon operate both as last-mile and backbone providers. TeliaSonera 
is a leading residential access ISP in the Finnish market and the second-largest Tier 1 
carrier in the world.30 On the other hand, the ISP can not only provide Internet access 
but also act as a CSP or be closely affiliated to CSPs. Further, ISPs can be horizontally 
integrated and act as telephone operators, for example. A large and integrated 
telecommunications firm can offer a broadband, cable television, streaming, and 
telephone subscription in the same bundle. Vertical integration does not necessarily 
reduce welfare and can solve issues such as double marginalization. Bandyopadhyay et 
al. (2010) find that vertical integration of an ISP can be beneficial in the short term 
but hurt competition in the content market. 
                                    
30 TeliaSonera International Carrier. research.dyn.com. Accessed 12 Nov 2014. 
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The broadband market is characterized by high switching costs. Switching an ISP can 
be both expensive and time-consuming to the end user due to new equipment needed 
with the new connection, the hassle of terminating the old contract, delay in the 
activation of the new connection, and so on. High switching costs aggravate the power 
an ISP can have over end users, and may result in vendor lock-in situations. The 
situation is more difficult in periphery areas. In some countries, such as Finland, there 
are government plans to require or incentivize ISPs to connect properly to periphery 
households, as it may not otherwise be economically profitable. In general, coverage 
and penetration of high-speed broadband access is lower in segregated areas. 
The broadband industry is highly analogous to electricity distribution: CSPs are 
comparable to electricity production firms and ISPs are comparable to electricity 
distribution firms. Like electricity distribution, fixed costs are high relative to marginal 
cost. Like electric power, bandwidth is not storable in the sense that any exceed supply 
at a given moment would contribute to inventories for the future; the output has to, 
at the least, equal the demand at all times, or else there will be blackouts and dropped 
connections. Another similarity between the markets is the prevalence of a zero-price 
rule: Local electric distribution operators charge end users but not appliance 
manufacturers (Hemphill 2008). In the electricity context two-sided pricing would 
admittedly seem impractical at the very least. The crucial difference between electricity 
distribution and telecommunications is that usually the principal national electrical 
grid is operated by a single transmission system operator and local endpoints of the 
distribution network by private distribution system operators. The analogous policy in 
the telecommunications market would then be that the principal data routes were 
controlled by national operators. The Internet is not centrally governed, however, and 
the backbone has been largely privatized. 
Perhaps more tangibly, a telecommunications network can be thought of as a physical 
road (Crocioni 2011), a classic case of a negative externality. Each car contributes to 
congestion, a social cost not internalized by drivers. As a result, the amount of traffic 
may be too large at the societal level. The textbook solution to this “tragedy of the 
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commons” is to impose a Pigouvian tax equal to the difference of the estimated social 
cost and private cost. The ISP – the road operator acting as a local government – 
would like to tax the drivers, CSPs. Prioritization plays a role in the road traffic 
analogy, as well, in the form of fast lanes for taxis and buses. 
Finally, one could reach out to draw an analogy to postal services, which often 
differentiate delivery options based on not only package size and weight but also 
destination and content type. 
Interconnection 
Behind the scenes, in the “wholesale” Internet interconnection market, business 
relations between residential ISPs, carriers, and CSPs can get messy. ISPs face a 
decision problem between peering and transit agreements. Peering differs from transit 
in that under a peering agreement between ISP A and B, ISP A has no obligation to 
terminate ISP B’s traffic to or from a third party (Jahn and Prüfer 2008). While in a 
peering agreement the ISPs use each other’s networks reciprocally, peering is not 
necessarily free for both parties. Peering agreements where no settlements are paid are 
sometimes referred to as “settlement-free peering” or “bill-and-keep peering,” whereas 
those involving settlements are referred to as “paid peering” or just “peering” (Jahn and 
Prüfer 2008). Transit comes in many forms, as well: Full transit (access to all routes), 
partial transit, and access to specific routes. In settlement-free peering, the loads the 
ISPs exert on each other’s networks are usually quite symmetric. Under asymmetry, 
the larger network will theoretically prefer a reciprocal fee on peering, set equal to cost 
(Carter and Wright 2003). 
When an end user streams video from Netflix to her computer, the video stream goes 
through carriers, e.g. Cogent, before reaching the end user’s, e.g. a Comcast customer’s, 
residential end node. When many of its customers start using Netflix and increase their 
traffic volume, Comcast may have to purchase additional capacity from Cogent and 
incur additional costs. Else, Comcast’s gateways may become congested and QoS 
degrade for its customers. Nothing, however, prevents Comcast and Netflix from 
signing an interconnect agreement where both invest in a new interconnection point 
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directly connecting Netflix servers to a Comcast network, thus bypassing Cogent 
networks altogether. The benefit to Comcast is reduced costs (since transit is relatively 
expensive) and less congestion, and the benefit to Netflix is an improved customer 
experience.31 Today, it is not rare anymore for CSPs to pay ISPs for enhanced network 
access. While these direct interconnect agreements do not fall under the scope of the 
mainstream neutrality debate, the case becomes relevant from the debate’s perspective 
if it turns out that Comcast has either (a) throttled Netflix traffic or (b) threatened to 
throttle Netflix traffic to secure an interconnection deal where Netflix pays an 
interconnection fee to gain direct access to Comcast customers. The latter scenario 
could then in effect constitute termination pricing. While the terms of actual Comcast–
Netflix and Verizon–Netflix agreements from February and April 2014 remain 
undisclosed, the FCC is investigating the matter.32 Netflix streams reportedly sped up 
by some 65% on average for Comcast customers after the deal. 
Although happening behind the scenes, ISP interconnection agreements indeed have 
real effects on the QoS observed by end users. Recalling the one-way access problem, 
QoS by residential ISPs may be constrained by the carrier network through which they 
access the backbone: Congestion can occur on the carrier side, as empirically illustrated 
by Figure 6. Notably, QoS degradation is not always as much a result of a true technical 
limitation as of inter-ISP business relations. 
A CSP may itself operate as a platform in a two- or multi-sided market. These kinds 
of CSPs can be called content network platforms (CNPs), and they act as intermediaries 
between end users and other CSPs (Mialon and Banerjee 2014). Hence also content 
markets have hierarchical structures. Fuelled by the explosive growth of Internet traffic 
with high QoS requirements, another particular business model has emerged: A content 
delivery network (CDN) that interconnects a CSP to backbone ISPs to ensure high-
performance delivery of content, acting as an intermediary between the CSPs and ISPs. 
The use of a CDN can be more cost-efficient for the CSP than directly connecting to 
                                    
31 QoS also depends on the capacity of the CSP’s own servers. The source can be self-limiting, i.e. the 
data rate may be constrained at the CSP’s end. 
32 gigaom.com. Accessed 13 Nov 2014. 
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multiple ISPs – the latter strategy is called multi-homing. The largest, most data-
intensive CSPs, Netflix and Google, have recently invested massively in their own in-
house CDNs.33 There can be substantial economies of scale, as Netflix and YouTube 
account for approximately 50% of US end users’ Internet traffic. Other leading CDNs 
include Akamai, Limelight, and Level 3. 
Figure 6. Carrier as a bottleneck. TWC, Comcast, and Verizon end users in the NYC area 
experienced substantial QoS degradation (decreased median download throughput) when 
connecting through a Cogent network during May 2013 – February 2014, after which Cogent 
apparently rerouted traffic, increased capacity, or allocated more bandwidth to the three ISPs. 
Cablevision customers connecting through the same network experienced no QoS degradation. 
Source: ISP Interconnection and its Impact on Consumer Internet Performance. Measurement 
Lab Consortium report, 2014. 
 
Characteristics of the Finnish, EU, and US Markets 
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA, fin. Viestintävirasto) 
oversees ISPs in Finland. The main last-mile fixed broadband technologies in use in 
Finland in 2013 were, in order of popularity, xDSL, cable modem, Ethernet (optical 
fiber), FTTH (“fiber to the home”), and housing cooperative broadband. The share of 
optical fiber technologies is increasing while that of DSL is declining. In the EU, FTTx 
represented less than 5% of the market in 2011, compared to about one-half in e.g. 
Japan and South Korea.34 The number of mobile broadband connections in Finland 
                                    
33 www.businessinsider.com. Accessed 8 Dec 2014. 
34 Insights on the European Telecoms Market: Analysis, Forecasts and Commentary. Telecoms Market 
Research report, 2011. 
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increased by 600% between 2008 and 2013, and the majority of new broadband 
subscriptions are wireless.35 As of June 2014, there were 1.32 mobile broadband 
subscriptions (more than in any other country in the world) and 0.31 fixed broadband 
connections per person in Finland.36 Despite high broadband penetration, the Finnish 
broadband market exemplifies the “one to three ISPs to choose from” rule as an 
oligopoly where three market leaders share most of the market. In 2013, 85% of the 
fixed broadband connections and 99% of the mobile broadband connections in Finland 
were provided by three ISPs: Elisa, TeliaSonera, and DNA. Smaller ISPs in Finland 
include 24 local operators under the Finnet group with a 12% total market share in 
fixed broadband and a number of small, local, or specialized players. Close to 200 
Finnish firms or subsidiaries have submitted a telecommunications notification to 
FICORA, many of these inactive.37 The fact remains that the Finnish market is the 
most concentrated in the EU (Calzada and Martínez-Santos 2014). In this light, it is 
surprising that the PPP-adjusted prices in Finland are below the EU average; the 
history of municipal ownership, advanced technological infrastructure, and government 
support schemes provide partial explanation. In 2008, the Finnish government initiated 
a “Broadband 2015” project to ensure high-speed broadband access in sparsely 
populated areas. Expected public subsidies total €130m.38 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the US broadband market does not function as well 
as the EU markets. The limitations in US end users’ ISP choice are severe: Less than 
10% of US consumers can choose between more than two ISPs in the case of a 10 Mbps 
connection; the percentage is much lower for faster connections.39 This may in part be 
due to the lack of local-loop unbundling in the US since around 2005 (Hogendorn 2007). 
Title II reclassification would not directly reinstate local-loop unbundling, either. The 
US wireless broadband industry is highly concentrated (Rosston and Topper 2010). 
                                    
35 Toimialakatsaus 2013. Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority report. 
36 OECD Broadband Portal. www.oecd.org. Accessed 14 March 2015. 
37 www.viestintavirasto.fi. Accessed 14 Jan 2015. 
38 www.viestintavirasto.fi. Accessed 29 Dec 2014. 
39 NTIA State Broadband Initiative. Accessed 30 Dec 2014. 
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The situation is aggravated by general customer dissatisfaction; Comcast won the 
Consumerist’s “Worst Company in America” award in 2014.40 The proposed merger of 
Comcast and Time Warner Cable, which share more than two-thirds of the US 
broadband cable market and approximately 40% of the US broadband market as a 
whole, would make the broadband product market still more concentrated (although 
the companies maintain that they operate in separate geographical markets). As it 
happens, the merger has direct relevance to the neutrality debate, as Comcast has 
agreed to extend their commitment to the Open Internet Order to span the whole of 
Comcast-TWC as a merger remedy, although only until 2018.41 Relative to their EU 
peers, US consumers have paid more for an equivalent connection.42 For example, in 
Kansas City, MO, in 2013, the least expensive 10 Mbps connection reportedly cost $112 
per month.42 For comparison, in Turku, Finland, an equivalent connection cost €20 
per month. However, Kansas City is better off now with Google Fiber available there 
along with a dozen other locations in the US. The Fiber is a noteworthy development 
in the US market because 5-Mbps access is free after a $300 construction fee, and 1 
Gbps costs $70 per month.43 The FCC’s National Broadband Plan has since 2010 
subsidized infrastructure investment to improve broadband access in the US, but a 
2015 report finds that “broadband [at least 4 Mbps downstream] is not being deployed 
to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.”44 OECD does report an over 100% 
wireless broadband penetration in the US.36 OECD gives $44 as the PPP-corrected US 
average monthly price in 2012 for fixed connections over 2.5 Mbps in speed – the sixth 
most expensive (behind Turkey, Spain, Chile, Norway, and Luxembourg) in the 34-
country sample. In Finland, the average price was $26.45  
                                    
40 consumerist.com. Accessed 12 Jan 2015. 
41 Comcast response to US Senate. www.franken.senate.gov. Retrieved 19 Dec 2014. 
42 The Cost of Connectivity. Open Technology Institute, New America foundation report, 2013, 2014. 
Accessed 30 Dec 2014. 
43 fiber.google.com. Accessed 2 Jan 2015. 
44 arstechnica.com. Accessed 8 Jan 2015. 
45 OECD Communications Outlook 2013. 
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3.3 Supply and Demand for Connectivity 
The supply and demand for broadband services, viz. Internet connectivity, are related 
to factors on the ISP side as well as on the end-user side. Supply is determined by both 
ISP-internal factors such as cost structure and technological developments. Moreover, 
the ISP’s external environment, including the competitive and regulatory landscape 
affect supply decisions. Network neutrality has also direct effects on the ISP’s revenue 
and costs. 
On the end-user side, the demand for connectivity depends on a number of factors. 
Theoretically, the fundamental factor behind the demand for connectivity is the 
demand for Internet content. The ISP is merely the intermediary between end users 
and content, and would add no value if there were no CSPs on the Internet. As a 
typical firm acts both as a set of end-users (Internet access at workplace, cloud systems, 
the industrial Internet etc.) and a CSP (company websites, online services etc.), it 
contributes to the demand for connectivity through both its downstream demand for 
broadband access and upstream supply of content. Market prices of broadband 
connections ultimately determine “quantities” demanded when moving along end users’ 
demand curves. Figure 7 breaks down an economic framework for the broadband 
market. 
Figure 7. Framework for the broadband market. Supply and demand drivers determine 
broadband prices, QoS, penetration, and coverage. 
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Supply 
At the general computer-networking level, data transport services can be categorized 
into (1) guaranteed or “dedicated,” (2) best-effort, and (3) flexible bandwidth-sharing 
services as in Afèche (2006). Most retail contracts and Internet interconnect agreements 
fall under the best-effort category. Indeed, retail contracts list the connection speed as 
“up to x megabits per second.” Dedicated bandwidth usually comes with service-level 
agreements (SLAs). A typical household connection is asymmetric with less upstream 
than downstream bandwidth allocated to it by the ISP (e.g. a download-to-upload 
speed ratio of 10:1), due the fact that a typical end user uploads less than downloads. 
It is extremely unlikely that all users use 100% of their bandwidths simultaneously. 
Therefore, analogously to banks’, insurance companies’, or airlines’ operation relying 
on the law of large numbers – banks do not expect everyone to withdraw their holdings 
simultaneously; insurance companies do not expect everyone to have an accident at the 
same time; airlines expect a fraction of people to cancel their tickets – the ISP can 
oversubscribe by allocating users nominal bandwidths under the expectation that 
aggregate load averages out to a level below the sum of nominal allocations. Hence, the 
allocation is merely virtual, as in reality packet switching allows data streams to be 
statistically multiplexed together, that is, intermingled to reduce slack. The 
oversubscription ratio (or “contention ratio”) may range from something like 5:1 to 
anywhere over 100:1 depending on the case. Oversubscription is becoming more 
challenging with many users streaming video, which requires high and constant QoS in 
contrast to “bursty” web surfing traffic that averages out across users. The fact that 
the aggregate load on the network evens out to a degree does not mean it would be 
deterministic: Far from it, large stochastic fluctuations remain. Even with 
oversubscription, or precisely because of it, networks tend to be lightly utilized relative 
to their theoretical capacity – this is overprovisioning. Utilization rates around 5% on 
average and around 25% at peak loads (Afèche 2006) reflect the redundancy in the 
networks. 
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An overarching characteristic of the broadband business is that fixed costs dominate 
the total cost structure (Lyons 2013). Fixed costs include the sunk cost of upfront 
investment in network infrastructure, operating and maintenance costs, and fixed 
interconnection contracts. Sunk investment is made continually over time (Sidak 2006). 
The marginal cost of transmitting a packet is small but nonzero, for there are peering 
and transit, maintenance, and other costs that depend on the amount of data 
transmitted. As the time horizon is stretched, fixed costs such as infrastructure 
investment become variable. In the short run, peak loads exceeding the network 
capacity force the ISP to purchase external capacity. Strictly speaking, marginal cost 
as a function of the total amount of data transmitted by the ISP can jump at the point 
where initial capacity runs out and the ISP has to purchase more. Public estimates are 
difficult to come by, but two of these put the ISPs’ average marginal cost from fixed 
broadband traffic in the order of €0.01 per GB,46;47 and another puts the transit price 
in the order of €1 per Mbps per month48 (note the units) depending on location. (Also 
note that, due to oversubscription, in practice 1 Mbps to the ISP translates to more 
than 1 Mbps to an end user.) For mobile traffic, costs are likely to be an order of 
magnitude higher. Costs have decreased drastically over the past years especially with 
wireless technologies and will continue to do so. In the case of mobile broadband in the 
EU, the prices ISPs charge end users for additional data over a data cap range 
somewhere from €0.1 per MB to €1 per MB; the unit price is generally lower than this 
when one purchases a larger bundle at once. 
If traffic increases above the ISP’s initial capacity, capacity needs to be added through 
transit or peering (in the short run), or equipment and infrastructure installations (in 
the long run). Large infrastructure projects, e.g. optical fiber installations, can cost 
hundreds of millions and take years to complete. Peering calls for larger volumes than 
transit and becomes cost-efficient at the point where the unit price of peering – inclusive 
                                    
46 Delivering High Quality Video Services Online. Analysys-Mason report for Ofcom, 2009. Retrieved 2 
January 2015. 
47 The Cost of Incremental Internet Transit Bandwidth in the Local Access Cloud. Lemay-Yates 
Associates report for Netflix, 2011. Retrieved 2 January 2015. 
48 www.drpeering.net. Accessed 21 Jan 2015. 
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of the cost from the extra load on the network from the other ISP’s traffic – decreases 
to equal the unit price of transit.48 Transit is usually priced per megabits per second 
(Mbps) or gigabits per second (Gbps) per month, sometimes based on allocated 
bandwidth regardless of whether the customer ISP uses it all. Transit can be priced ex 
ante or ex post. Among larger ISPs metered services are reportedly more common.48 
Metering is typically based on “burstable billing,” most typically the 95-percentile 
method, where the transit provider calculates the average bandwidth consumption in 
five-minute samples and discards the top 5% of the samples for anomalies.49 
Unsurprisingly, this has provoked strategies where the customer utilizes maximum 
bandwidth for 5% of the time and minimally for the rest of the time. In an unmetered 
contract, the ISP purchases fixed “transit bundles” for lump-sum fees and, consequently, 
near-zero intra-bundle marginal costs. Transit often comes with significant volume 
discounts (Faratin et al. 2008). Pricing may be regional and customized with different 
sorts of side deals. The customer often has to commit to a certain bandwidth and 
contract period at once. A typical transit agreement stipulates best-effort delivery. 
Overall, not much public information is available on interconnection pricing practices. 
The ISP’s overall cost profile depends heavily on the ISP’s positioning in the 
interconnection ecosystem. An estimation of per-user infrastructure cost in wireless 
networks by Johansson et al. (2007) gives a constant per-user cost up to a certain 
volume of downloaded data; after this “congestion threshold,” the cost increases 
exponentially. Figure 8 roughly represents a hypothetical ISP’s marginal, average, and 
total cost functions with respect to the volume of data transmitted. 
A significantly easier choice when modeling the market is to stick to the assumption of 
constant or even zero marginal cost; this is done in most of the neutrality-related 
theoretical models. In reality, marginal cost factors in the ISP’s routing and pricing 
decisions. An essential realization, following Laffont and Tirole’s (2000) point, is that 
marginal cost can be calculated by taking the first derivative of the total cost function 
with respect to not only the amount of data transmitted – which can be measured as 
                                    
49 wikipedia.org. Accessed 22 Jan 2015. 
  
36 K. Eerola / Aalto Uni. 
average bandwidth usage over some time interval or some other metric – but for 
example the number of active users or QoS. Moreover, the choice of units and the time 
scale crucially affect the look of the cost functions. What the most meaningful cost 
accounting method or cost formula is when calculating variable costs in 
telecommunications remains an open question. Still, an understanding of the cost 
structure in the broadband industry is essential for modeling and regulation purposes. 
Figure 8. Marginal cost, average cost, and total cost functions for an ISP. Marginal 
cost (MC), average cost (AC), and total cost (TC) are plotted against the total amount of data 
transmitted. In the short run, transit and peering is variable but large-scale infrastructure 
remains fixed. If the values on the horizontal axis are updated over time as infrastructure is 
gradually upgraded in response to increasing Internet traffic, the functions can be interpreted 
to apply also to the long run. Marginal cost is close to zero up to a congestion threshold (t), 
on which it starts to increase. When transit is priced in larger bundles relative to traffic 
volumes, cost functions are more “discrete” (gray graphs). 
 
Demand 
The technical specifics of a connection are not typically of interest to the end user who 
is, at best, concerned with the general QoS requirements: Bandwidth, latency, and loss 
(Afèche 2006). Specifying customers’ requirements is relevant to modeling the market 
because QoS metrics have an effect on consumer utility and the demand for 
connectivity. Congestion in the network is reflected as a decrease in QoS and is thus 
of interest for modeling end-user demand. 
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Rosston et al. (2010) empirically evaluate the demand for broadband Internet services 
in the US, and choice-experiment on US consumers’ willingness to pay for 
improvements in service levels. First, they find that at least the income level, age, 
geographical location, and online “skills” shape residential end users’ marginal 
willingness to pay for a faster connection. The difference between the perceived value 
of a “very fast” and a “fast” connection, vaguely as they are defined, is found to be 
insignificant, whereas the difference in value between a fast and a “slow” connection is 
significant. In other words, the expected marginal utility from connection speed is 
decreasing and would seem to be zero with faster connections. Higher-income 
households value a fast connection more than lower-income households do. Young 
households value speed and reliability more than older ones. Likewise, the level of 
education correlates positively with the willingness to pay for speed, but negatively 
with the willingness to pay for reliability. Urban households value reliability more than 
rural ones. Finally, better online “skills” imply a higher willingness to pay for speed. 
Nurski (2014) estimates that increasing the connection speed of a given broadband 
service (out of multiple options) by 1% increases the market share for the given service 
by 1.5% in the UK. The estimated UK price elasticity of demand is -3.4, so the demand 
for connectivity appears to be quite elastic. 
3.4 Supply and Demand for Content 
Internet content can be thought of as the fundamental factor of the demand for 
connectivity. However, while content and connectivity are two distinct commodities, 
they are only meaningful products in relation to each other, and, as such, it is 
problematic to isolate the demand for either one from the other (Hande et al. 2009). 
Even so, the first thing to note about the supply and demand dynamics of Internet 
content is that the supply of additional content may not result in end users increasing 
their aggregate demand for content or connectivity substantially; supply does not 
necessarily create its own demand as Say’s law says. While we can interact with 
multiple online services simultaneously, at least with current technology we are able to 
multitask only to a degree. Even as content on average becomes more and more data-
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intensive, now it is the number of hours in a day that I would argue is the limiting 
factor in the demand for content in the aggregate (or rather, content that is consumed 
“actively” as opposed to background processes). Additional content, provided it has 
demand in the first place, merely makes users reallocate their time and traffic; if one 
gets a free option to choose between four video streaming services instead of three, one 
does not simply watch 33% more films, and even if does, it is at the cost of time 
available for other types of content. In a way, content can create a nearly zero-sum 
game. 
If Internet content is construed as a distinct set of non-physical and substitutable 
goods, the market for it is flooded. At the risk of creating an arbitrary dichotomy, even 
though the Internet permeates our lives in ever more ways, is it still perhaps possible 
to conceptualize it as in some sense separate from our physical activities? Be that as it 
may, it may not be meaningless to analyze the supply and demand for Internet content 
as a whole. The supply-demand diagram for content drawn in Figure 9 provides some 
straightforward economic intuition into why the average price of online content is close 
to zero: The supply of content has exploded and the price has dropped dramatically. 
Revisiting the theoretical framework of Figure 7, the demand for Internet content, if 
measured through volumes, can be empirically meaningless for the demand for 
connectivity if we are in a saturated zone where a change in the total amount of content 
is not relevant anymore. In other words, the marginal utility from the volume of content 
or total number of CSPs is decreasing, and we may have reached a point where the 
value of an additional unit of content is infinitesimal. Instead of the amount of content 
per se, we should think of content innovation as the driver of the demand for content 
and connectivity. 
Most of the network neutrality studies model the demand for connectivity through the 
demand for content. When this framework is chosen, the mathematical formulation of 
the demand has crucial effects on the theoretical results. 
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Figure 9. Evolution of the supply and demand for Internet content.50 The time 
allocated to content is used as the numéraire for the quantity of content demanded, as time 
can be thought of as a more general metric than e.g. the amount of transmitted data. Over the 
last 15 years or so, the supply of Internet content and services has mushroomed, which is 
reflected in the supply curve as a massive shift to the right (S → S'). Meanwhile, the aggregate 
demand for content has become inelastic (D → D') due to the fact that at the end of the day 
consumers have time constraints that bound the demand. In the end state (x), the average 
price of content has dropped close to zero (p → p'). 
 
At the individual level, end users’ content and service preferences tend to be “sticky.” 
For the sake of convenience, we stick to a specific service even when there are 
numerous, functionally equivalent or superior alternatives available. For the ISP, the 
demand profiles of different services are of high relevance because it can make different 
kinds of deals with CSPs and bundle its connections with content. Under non-neutrality 
its possibilities are wider. 
In the economic dimension, Internet traffic can be divided into CSP-to-CSP and CSP-
to-end user traffic, the former being insignificant in volume relative to the latter. From 
an end user’s point of view, traffic can be classified into online activities such as web 
surfing, Skyping, video and audio streaming, and gaming. Ads, a main source of revenue 
to CSPs, are often considered a nuisance by end users. While Anderson (2003) provides 
a framework of the broadcasting industry that associates the social marginal benefit of 
                                    
50 An equivalent diagram has been uploaded by Albert Wenger to ShowMe. It could be a good thing as 
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advertising with advertisers’ willingness to pay for visibility, inefficiency still arises in 
many scenarios, as the monopoly platform does not fully internalize the nuisance costs. 
From an ISP’s point of view, traffic can be classified into (1) sensitive traffic, (2) best-
effort traffic, and (3) undesired traffic.51 Sensitive traffic has high QoS requirements 
with respect to latency, jitter, and loss, and includes video conferencing, VoIP, and 
gaming. QoS is not deemed as crucial for best-effort traffic, such as P2P or email traffic. 
Video streaming belongs somewhere in the neighborhood of sensitive and best effort. 
In 2013, video constituted two-thirds of the volume of Internet traffic; the share is 
predicted to increase to over 80% by 2018.4 Undesired traffic includes spam and other 
malicious or illegal content. Under non-neutrality and exclusivity contracts, it would 
include traffic from CSPs excluded by the ISP. 
3.5 Retail Pricing 
Retail Internet access pricing has evolved from time-metered pricing in the days of 
dial-up Internet into primarily flat-rate pricing schemes: The ISP typically charges the 
end user a flat monthly fee. The fee is typically dependent on the connection speed, 
not the total volume of data transmitted over a period. Calzada and Martínez-Santos 
(2014) empirically verify for the EU area the fact that price correlates with speed. An 
alternative pricing method is usage-based pricing. Pure usage-based pricing is nowadays 
rare. A pricing scheme that was becoming more uncommon but has been reintroduced 
by some ISPs is to charge the customer for a bundled amount of data and set an 
overage charge or restrict the bandwidth for usage exceeding the monthly data cap. 
This is a two- or three-part tariff technique with a fixed part and usage-based parts. 
The idea of nonlinear pricing is to capture consumer surplus more efficiently by 
increasing the quantity demanded with a lower unit price and then extracting the 
leftover surplus with a fixed fee, partially used to cover sunk infrastructure investment 
costs. Nonlinear pricing is theoretically efficient under preference heterogeneity, and 
                                    
51 wikipedia.org. Accessed 19 Nov 2014. Note that in contractual terms, the vast majority of traffic is 
delivered on a best-effort basis. 
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has a special role in the management of capacity-constrained resources such as 
broadband (Beckert 2005). Nonlinear pricing is more widely used in the case of mobile 
broadband subscriptions, among which metered subscription models are still sometimes 
seen. 
Even though resale of subscriptions is not practically possible in the broadband market 
and hence price discrimination cannot be arbitraged away by consumers, first-degree 
price discrimination is not particularly prominent among ISPs. Likewise, third-degree 
price discrimination, i.e. charging different prices for the same services based on the 
sales channel, customer location, age, or something else to that effect, is not widely 
practiced. On the other hand, second-degree price discrimination is almost universally 
practiced in the form of volume discounts, as again empirically verified by Calzada and 
Martínez-Santos (2014). For example, 10 Mbps might cost €20 per month, whereas 
100 Mbps costs €50 per month. Under non-neutrality, service tiering based on data 
discrimination can be thought to correspond to second-degree price discrimination. 
There is room for some ingenuity in bandwidth-based pricing, as well. At least in 
Finland it is typical for an ISP to offer a discounted price for the first month to year 
as a part of, say, a 24-month fixed-term contract. In the US, the monthly subscription 
fee reportedly drifts upward a dollar or so per month for some of a certain large ISP’s 
customers. If true, this can in fact be construed as first-degree price discrimination 
where the ISP “tests” the user’s valuation. 
Bundling and tying of broadband and content services have gained much popularity 
during the last years. The economic intuition of bundling is that offering two or more 
products in a single bundle can allow for more effective extraction of consumer surplus 
due to consumers’ differing willingness to pay for the products. Further, bundling can 
help in customer lock-in. The benefits from bundling are one of the reasons for why 
ISPs have expanded vertically into the online content, cable television, and mobile 
telephone markets. Bundled services that large ISPs offer with broadband connections 
range from streaming services and cable television channel bundles to mobile phone 
subscriptions and almost any value-added services, products, and content in between. 
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Some large ISPs are cable operators, including Comcast and Time Warner Cable. It 
has been speculated that the new rise of data caps is in part be due to vertically 
integrated ISPs shielding their cable services against competitors’ streaming services 
(Lyons 2013). Choi (2010) finds that tying in a two-sided market can be welfare-
enhancing if consumers can multi-home. With broadband, this is not usually the case, 
however. 
4. Empirical Effects of Network Non-Neutrality 
In this section, I evaluate the meaning of hypothetical deregulation for ISPs and the 
other market participants at a practical level, and consider the directions the 
broadband market might take. My approach is necessarily speculative to some degree, 
as non-neutrality at least in more extreme forms is still an imaginary scenario. By 
“deregulation” and “non-neutrality,” I mainly refer to the NMT, NNN, and DDZ regimes 
in Table 1, under which either termination pricing or data discrimination or both are 
deregulated. 
The imposition of a more neutral regime (NR, NN, NMR, NMZ) would effectively 
prevent the ISP from taking two kinds of actions: (1) the extraction of rent from CSPs 
and (2) the exclusion of CSPs from end users’ Internet content streams (Hemphill 
2008). Under non-neutrality, the one-way access scenario is in a way expanded. The 
framework of Figure 5 can now be reinterpreted to include CSPs. The position of a 
CSP is analogous to small ISPs having to pay Tier 1 and 2 ISPs for access to networks 
connecting them to end users.  However, in this case the local ISP is lifted upward in 
the hierarchy. In effect, neutrality regulation can in part be construed as a limitation 
on the vertical restraints ISPs can place on CSPs (Rosston and Topper 2010). 
Before continuing, it should be reminded it is conceivable that non-neutrality would 
not be optimal for the ISP in all scenarios. An ISP could capitalize on other ISP’s non-
neutrality and find a market niche in offering neutral connectivity – prevalence of non-
neutrality could create market pressure for neutrality. More generally, non-neutrality 
might foster “network diversity” and hence increase the number of dimensions in which 
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networks compete (Yoo 2006a). That being said, deregulation definitely has upside 
potential for ISPs. What would non-neutrality mean in practice, then? While 
speculative, it is sensible to anticipate certain general directions the broadband market 
might take in the event it happened to be deregulated. 
4.1 Prioritization and Pricing 
The deregulated ISP is likely to be incentivized to discriminate packets based on their 
source, destination, and content (e.g. Economides and Tåg 2013; Lee and Kim 2014; 
van Schewick 2007; Wu 2003). Data discrimination can be hypothesized to benefit the 
ISP through two distinct mechanisms: 
i. Direct revenue from paid prioritization and exclusivity contracts. 
ii. Extraction of consumer surplus through differential pricing. 
The practical implementation of prioritization at any layer is not a real problem for 
ISPs. A variety of technical methods including scheduling algorithms such as weighted 
fair queuing can be used to prioritize packets. Privacy issues arise (but are not discussed 
further here), as the ISP might use deep-packet inspection (DPI) to access the payload 
of a packet to determine its contents, in contrast to non-intrusively reading the DiffServ 
field. 
As a side note, again decomposing the concept of QoS into bandwidth and latency, the 
distinction between these two parameters turns out to have business relevance. It is 
possible for the non-neutral ISP to implement discrimination through either parameter. 
The ISP can, for instance, offer a connection with high speed (e.g. 100 Mbps 
downstream) but high latency for low-priority content (e.g. a 10-second waiting time 
before transmission), or a connection with minimal latency (no waiting time) but low 
speed (e.g. 1 Mbps) for low-priority content. 
Termination Pricing 
Under the NRT, NMT, and NNN regimes, i.e. without the zero-price rule, the ISP 
might then consider charging CSPs termination fees for access to its customer base, 
regardless of whether it prioritizes data or strikes exclusivity deals. Termination fees 
  
44 K. Eerola / Aalto Uni. 
can be thought of as analogous to roaming charges by mobile network operators (Jullien 
and Sand-Zantman 2014). In Economides and Tåg’s (2012) model, the profit-
maximizing ISP will charge CSPs a positive fee if they value access to additional end 
users more than end users value access to additional CSPs. By charging termination 
fees, an ISP with a high degree of market power can extract CSP surplus, as CSPs are 
forced to pay the ISP for access to a significant number of their customers. Under 
uncapped termination fees, the higher the degree of the ISP’s market power over a 
CSP, the higher a fee it is able to charge. This bargaining-power ratio is explicitly 
included in e.g. Choi and Kim’s (2010), Altman et al.’s (2011), and Hanawal and 
Altman’s (2013) models, and is in the latter ones seen to influence the parties’ 
preferences between the neutral and non-neutral regimes, with the intuitive outcome 
that a higher ISP-to-CSP bargaining power ratio makes the ISP prefer the non-neutral 
regime and the CSP prefer the neutral regime. 
Even if charging positive termination fees is allowed, termination pricing need not be 
completely deregulated. As listed in Table 1, termination pricing can be discriminatory 
or non-discriminatory (a uniform termination fee). At first glance, the ISP would 
appear to be better off with discriminatory termination pricing – which, if unregulated, 
allows differential pricing tactics also on the supply side – and to be likely to prefer 
discriminatory fees. The CSP would appear to be the worse off the higher the 
termination fee. However, the effect of termination fees on ISP and CSP surpluses is 
not necessarily this straightforward. Also, end users may or may not be the better off 
the lower the fee. I come back to the welfare implications of termination pricing in 
Section 5.2. 
Research on interconnection pricing in telecommunications can potentially be applied 
in evaluating termination fees if one assimilates CSPs with downstream ISPs as in the 
expanded one-way access problem. When applying research about telephony to 
broadband, one has to remember that the two do not share all their characteristics, 
although they are highly analogous. In mobile telephony, most studies on “off-net” 
termination rates (for calls terminating in competitors’ networks) point toward a lack 
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of threat of excessive rates under deregulation, though Tangerås (2014) finds that the 
threat exists if there are income effects in end-user demand. 
Paid Prioritization and Exclusivity Contracts 
Under the DDR, DDZ, and NNN regimes, prioritization can be based on not only the 
traffic class but also the specific CSP. Under the last non-neutral regime, while not 
necessarily dependent on payment flows between CSPs and the ISP, prioritization 
would most likely be closely linked to contracts in the forms of paid prioritization and 
exclusivity contracts. In paid prioritization, the ISP prioritizes the delivery of affiliated 
content over other content, and the affiliated CSP pays the ISP for the expedited 
delivery of its content. For the ISP, the direct benefit is the monetary flow from the 
CSP; for the CSP, the benefit is better access to and QoS for end users, viz. potential 
customers. If the basic connection offered by an ISP has very low QoS, the CSP 
resorting to the basic subscription is in danger of losing customers who do not have 
the patience to wait when connecting to the CSP with such slow speed, especially if 
competitors have fast-lane access. (Recall Krishnan and Sitaraman’s [2012] estimate of 
a 6% abandonment rate per one-second delay increment for video streams.) 
The other revenue channel from prioritization is more effective extraction of surplus 
from end users – differing in their valuation of access – in the form of differential 
pricing. The ISP needs to balance the two revenue streams from prioritization, i.e. 
direct payments from CSPs versus the extra surpluses extracted from end users through 
differential pricing, as these are not always compatible. Creating scarcity of access on 
the supply side to extract revenue from CSPs restricts the possibilities with the service 
offering and differentiation on the demand side. Moreover, cost minimization through 
network optimization plays a role. Paid prioritization might range from “soft” QoS 
differentiation across CSPs to strict exclusivity contracts where the ISP only lets 
content from an exclusive partner through. The latter would only be possible under 
the NNN regime. The ISP would be able to auction off access, i.e. exclusive contracts 
or the best QoS, to extract maximum revenue from CSPs. The specific form of the 
auction would depend on the situation. Access auctions would naturally not be possible 
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under a uniform or fair termination fee policy. Under a neutral slow lane policy, the 
ISP would be required to offer end users a basic subscription with neutral, non-
discriminated access to the Internet. Complementarily, a zero-price slow lane with 
acceptable QoS for CSPs can be required. If the definition of “acceptable” is low enough, 
it may turn out to be necessary for a bandwidth-hungry CSP to pay the last-mile ISP 
for sufficient QoS in the first place. 
Concerns about prioritization have been directed at vertically integrated ISPs in 
particular, and it is true that vertically integrated ISPs are especially incentivized to 
prioritize content (Economides and Hermalin 2012; Wang and Sun 2012; Waterman 
and Choi 2012). This follows from the fact that in-house content can yield more 
expected revenue than outside affiliated content due to customer lock-in, data, and 
synergy reasons. 
Tiering and Versioning 
Data discrimination in connection to differential pricing can be called tiering or 
versioning. More specifically, tiering can be considered a form of either product 
differentiation or second-degree price discrimination, depending on whether the tiered 
services the ISP offers under non-neutrality differ from each other more than 
superficially in cost. We can distinguish between two types of tiering the non-neutral 
ISP can practice: (1) QoS tiering and (2) access tiering. QoS tiering can be considered 
more closely product differentiation than access tiering can, as the cost of QoS is likely 
to be more significant than the cost of allowing access to CSPs. QoS tiering in the non-
neutral world should not be confused with ordinary user tiering. Now the ISP can tier 
its broadband services according to QoS for different traffic classes and individual CSPs 
as opposed to equally for all of a given end user’s traffic. The price of the connection 
can depend on both the average speed across all CSPs and the priorities or bandwidths 
given to different CSPs as per the terms of the end user’s contract. QoS tiering need 
not imply truly dedicated bandwidths; connectivity is still supplied on a best-effort 
basis, provided that certain average QoS with specific CSPs is more or less delivered 
as advertised. 
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In addition to QoS tiering, the non-neutral ISP might consider access tiering where 
customers pay separate fees for access to different CSPs or bundles of CSPs. The ISP 
might, for instance, offer as the entry-level service a connection that gives access only 
to basic content. Bundles that provide wider access to the Internet can be made 
available as more steeply priced options. The first complaint52 filed following the FCC 
Open Internet Order nicely gives the idea of tiering as it has already actually been 
practiced. Mobile operator MetroPCS, now part of T-Mobile, tiered its services as 
follows: (A) $40 base plan with unlimited GSM talk, text, Web browsing, and 
YouTube, (B) $50 plan which adds access to services such as Netflix and Skype, but 
with these capped at 1 GB per month, and (C) $60 plan without the data cap. In sum, 
tiering can be based on (i) preferential access and exclusivity contracts with CSPs or 
on differential pricing of (ii) access to CSPs and (iii) QoS to CSPs. As such, tiering can 
take the form of offering fast and slow lanes and wide and narrow access to the Internet. 
Tiering on the demand side implies similar tiering on the supply side. The ISP devises 
its tiering and versioning strategy to optimize not only the direct revenue from paid 
prioritization and exclusivity contracts but also extraction of end-user surplus through 
differential pricing. Pricing the tiered services on both sides then becomes quite 
difficult. Optimizing its product mix and prices on either side, the ISP maximizes profit 
subject to end users’ and CSPs’ supply and demand profiles, its interconnection costs, 
and other factors. The general profit-maximizing pricing model could perhaps be 
something along the lines of a two-sided two- or three-part tariff such that end users 
pay monthly subscription fee ܵ + ݂(ܽ, ݍ, ݀), where ܵ is a common base fee and ݂ is a 
pricing function. ܽ is the access tier, ݍ = (ݍଵ, … , ݍ௜ , … , ݍ௞) is QoS with traffic classes or 
specific CSPs, and ݀ = (݀ଵ, … ,݀௜ , … , ݀௞) is the volume of data transmitted by the end 
user within traffic classes or through specific CSPs; డ௙
డ௔
> 0, డ௙
డ௤೔
> 0 ∀݅, and డ௙
డௗ೔
≥ 0 ∀݅. 
డ௙
డௗ೔
= 0 ∀݅ translates to no usage-based price components. Analogously, a CSP pays 
termination fee ܶ + ݃(݌, ܿ), where ܶ is a common base fee and ݃(ܿ) is the pricing 
                                    
52 MetroPCS letter to FCC. www.freepress.net. Retrieved 10 Dec 2014. 
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function reflecting the priority of the CSP’s traffic lane (݌), the ISP’s capacity 
provisioning costs (ܿ), and the parties’ negotiation power balance. The ISP should set 
the differential prices to satisfy the incentive compatibility and individual rationality 
constraints: End users (CSPs) with high valuation should get more utility from a high-
tier service net of the subscription fee (termination fee) than from a low-tier service, 
and hence prefer the high-tier service. Naturally, they should also stand to gain from 
transacting in the first place. 
Tiering can be combined with data caps, where the end user pays for each additional 
megabyte or gigabyte after a predefined threshold. Provided the ISP charges over 
marginal cost, it is probably not in its interest to do much to prevent the user from 
transferring the extra bytes. But the ISP might consider offering, say, YouTube a deal 
where YouTube clips do not count toward the user’s data cap. As noted by Claffy and 
Clark (2014), so far at least Facebook has paid certain mobile carriers for providing 
their customers free access to Facebook. On the whole, it can readily be seen that the 
possibilities for the ISP in tiering and versioning are practically limitless. Figure 10 
sketches a simplified pricing framework under non-neutrality. 
Figure 10. Tiering under non-neutrality. The ISP can differentiate the connections based 
on access level and QoS, and set subscription fees ଵܵ > ܵଶ > ܵଷ and termination fees ଵܶ > ଶܶ >
ଷܶ accordingly to maximize profit. 
 
4.2 Fragmentation 
Internet fragmentation is a hypothesized large-scale consequence of network non-
neutrality. Network neutrality has not been studied extensively from the fragmentation 
point of view, with D’Annunzio and Russo (2013), Hill (2012), Kourandi et al. (2014), 
and Lee and Wu (2009) as some noteworthy exceptions. Fragmentation refers to 
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isolation of Internet services and users from each other due to access and QoS tiering 
by ISPs. We can distinguish between two levels of fragmentation: Content 
fragmentation and physical fragmentation (cf. Internet layers). The neutrality debate 
is mainly concerned with content fragmentation, and non-neutrality is unlikely to pose 
a direct threat of physical fragmentation. Fragmentation at both layers can also be 
caused by external factors, such as governmental censorship. 
Remember that the non-neutral ISPs under the DDR, DDZ, and NNN regimes may be 
able to auction off exclusive access for a CSP to their end users. This is possible if the 
expected revenue from access to the ISP’s customers, over which the ISP may have a 
monopoly, is high enough for CSPs. More often than not, the ISP has bargaining power 
over the CSP. However, this is not always true, and an opposite situation may actually 
emerge if the value of a CSP is high enough in the eyes of ISPs. Then, the ISPs may 
end up competing for an exclusive arrangement with the CSP (Lee and Wu 2009; Lotfi 
et al. 2014). Lotfi et al. (2014) model this inverted setup game-theoretically, and in 
their outcome – while the CSP is able to control the ISP to a degree – the ISP still 
retains its power and can actually extract some of the CSP’s surplus. Funnily enough, 
the endgame is the same at both market extremes: Fragmentation of access to content. 
When ISPs have bargaining power over CSPs, deregulating data discrimination and 
exclusivity contracts is prone to increase the risk of content fragmentation because 
ultimately there is no guarantee that the ISPs providing broadband services with 
differentiated access to content coordinate between each other so that each piece of 
content is reached by each end user. Mandating a neutral slow lane to have ISPs offer 
at least one connection with full, neutral access to CSPs would alleviate the problem. 
A minimum-QoS standard would similarly contribute to the prevention of 
fragmentation. Finally, a zero-price and full-access slow lane for CSPs would enable 
even the smallest CSPs to access to all end users. Even so, fragmentation can in practice 
still occur if either the neutral connection for end users or the zero-price slow lane for 
CSPs has untenably low QoS, and if better connections are not accessible (in terms of 
price) to all end users – then not all end users are truly able to interact with everyone 
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else. Retail price regulation (NR, NMR, DDR) would, in turn, mitigate this problem. 
Also, the minimum-QoS standard should accordingly be set high enough both in 
absolute terms and relative to the average and fastest connections available. 
A fragmented Internet stands in contrast to the idea of the Open Internet, and is 
harmful to both consumer surplus and total welfare (D’Annunzio and Russo 2013; 
Kourandi et al. 2014). The dystopia of fragmentation is that the largest ISPs actually 
collude with each other and the largest CSPs to exclude or discriminate against the 
rest of the CSPs’ traffic. Content markets would concentrate, and end user would have 
a limited number of CSPs to choose from, and perhaps at low QoS depending on the 
user’s purchasing power. Due to market pressure from end users, however, this is 
somewhat unlikely, and were it to happen, competition authorities would likely react 
(Hill 2012). A related but not directly non-neutrality-related dystopia is that the 
exclusion might extend into the inter-ISP market so that the largest ISPs end up 
forming exclusive peering relationships between the other, excluding smaller ISPs. As 
with data discrimination, vertical integration may cause concerns in regard to 
fragmentation: If vertically integrated backbone operators (e.g. AT&T or Verizon) 
decided to peer exclusively with each other, other backbone providers might imitate 
this strategy, and the end state would be both an oligopolistic and a vertically 
integrated Internet backbone that divides the Internet into detached archipelagos (Hill 
2012). 
The zero-price rule in itself may be neither sufficient nor necessary to prevent 
fragmentation (D’Annunzio and Russo 2013; Lee and Wu 2009; Kourandi et al. 2014). 
As the rule only concerns supply-side pricing, ISPs adhering to the rule will still be 
able to tier their services, although purely based on differential pricing tactics rather 
than direct payment flow from CSPs. More generally, the degree of neutrality and the 
level of fragmentation are not necessarily directly proportional to each other, and the 
relation may not be monotonic. Introducing termination fees does not necessarily lead 
to fragmentation, either (D’Annunzio and Russo 2013).  
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4.3 Innovation and Investment 
Innovation at the Core 
Investment in network infrastructure will not break even below a population density 
threshold (Götz 2013). Since it is not profitable to extend the infrastructure into all 
rural areas, governments have initiated universal-access agendas to subsidize network 
expansion. Investment can be made toward broadband coverage (geographical areas 
covered), penetration (percentage of people covered), and QoS. While the duplication 
of infrastructure in a regulated network industry can have a positive consumer-surplus 
effect (Krämer and Vogelsang 2014), for firms at the investment stage it often makes 
no sense. However, the natural-monopoly characteristics of the networks can make co-
investment and joint infrastructure projects economically rational for ISPs. Then again, 
infrastructure cooperation facilitates tacit collusion in the retail market, and the 
consumer-surplus effect of co-investments is ambiguous (Krämer and Vogelsang 2014). 
In contrast to the regulator’s aspirations, coverage, penetration, and QoS are not of 
interest to the ISP as such, but only if investment in them pays back. An interesting 
question arises about the dynamic consequences of network neutrality: How does 
neutrality regulation affect ISPs’ incentives to invest in infrastructure? It has been 
widely established that competition in both the retail broadband market and 
interconnection market increases broadband investment, although there is a tradeoff 
between coverage and penetration (see Götz [2013] for a review). Neutrality can affect 
ISP investment through either direct changes in ISP profit or changes in the 
competitive landscape. Intuitively, non-neutrality is more likely than not to increase 
profits. Some ISPs have maintained that deregulating neutrality and allowing more 
differentiated services would enable them to use any extra profits to invest in new 
infrastructure, benefiting the society in the end. If this happens, deregulation can be 
dynamically efficient. An opposing argument is that neutrality increases the level of 
competition between ISPs and therefore stimulates investment in infrastructure. From 
studies about access-price regulation, we know it is prone to reduce the ISP’s incentives 
to invest in quality-enhancing technology (Cambini and Jiang 2009; Kotakorpi 2006). 
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More generally, Cambini and Jiang’s review on the literature on telecommunications 
investment incentives under price-cap regulation concludes that stringent price caps 
can reduce investment in infrastructure. However, a price cap set relatively high may 
not have such an effect. 
Some of the mathematical models to be summarized in Section 5.2 provide predictions 
of how ISPs’ investment incentives differ between the neutral and the non-neutral 
regimes. Taken together, the models support the view that the price or network 
regulation of the more neutral regimes has the unwanted side effect of inhibiting 
investment and degrading dynamic efficiency. Although over-investment is not socially 
optimal, either, most of the models predict that under-investment is the more probable 
outcome under non-neutrality. Under neutrality, the investment level would in more 
cases be closer to the social optimum. Under the NMR, NMZ, and NMT regimes, where 
the line is drawn at throttling, a possibility that cannot be discounted is that the ISP 
decides to operate at the capacity limit to justify prioritization, which would de-
incentivize capacity investment. The ISP could also create artificial scarcity for similar 
purposes. 
In comparison to the regulated case, non-neutral ISPs have more freedom to innovate 
“at the core” of the network. Innovation might mean network optimization through 
new technologies, which need not be used for “malevolent” practices from the ISP side, 
but could help bring a better online experience to end users. Moreover, excess 
regulation can be argued to threaten the natural and continual evolution of the Internet 
and hence unnecessarily limit the possibilities it brings about. As Yoo (2006b) argues, 
neutrality might hinder innovation at the core: “Allowing network owners to employ 
different protocols can foster innovation by allowing a wider range of network products 
to exist. Conversely, compulsory standardization can reduce consumer surplus by 
limiting the variety of products available. In the words of two leading commentators 
on network economics, ‘market equilibrium with multiple incompatible products 
reflects the social value of variety.’”  
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Innovation at the Edge 
Ultimately, content on the Internet is the source of value to end users. (In marketing, 
applications fundamental to the value of the platform are called “killer applications.”) 
The effects of neutrality regulation on CSP innovation – innovation at the edge of the 
network – are crucial to the overall welfare implications. Unfortunately, only a fraction 
of the theoretical models give predictions of the content-innovation dynamics under 
different regulatory regimes. According to those mathematical models that address this 
question, the prediction of the effect of neutrality regulation on CSP innovation is more 
ambiguous than the near-consensus prediction of a negative effect on ISP investment. 
It is possible that termination pricing hinders competition among CSPs and creates 
barriers to entry, the idea being that the more powerful, incumbent CSPs may be able 
to buy their way to end users over a market entrant, even when the entrant would 
have the more innovative and data-efficient service. Start-ups and small CSPs that rely 
on online presence and have not started to generate revenue might become heavily 
burdened by termination fees. Small CSPs are then prone to suffer more from non-
neutrality (Bourreau et al. 2013). This would hinder entrepreneurship and have a 
negative impact on competition in online markets (Sydell 2006). An opposing point of 
view is that tiering can encourage CSPs to employ higher QoS in tailoring services to 
end users’ demands (Kulick and Weisman 2010).  The tremendous diversity of CSPs 
means that non-neutrality affects them in divergent ways, making ubiquitous 
conclusions difficult to draw. CSPs more reliant on access to customers might suffer 
more. Industry-wise, especially affected by termination fees, tiering, and fragmentation 
may be “infopreneurs” whose whole business model of gathering and selling information 
on the Internet is based on wide access. Another group of CSPs that might suffer 
relatively much are those with a long-tail revenue model, catering to niche markets 
through a dispersed online presence (Lee and Wu 2009). 
The rationality of “extorting” CSPs depends on the relative power of the ISP and the 
effects of surplus extraction on CSP participation. As we have seen, the absolute 
amount of content on the Internet is huge. But since the demand for new, diverse, and 
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innovative content is the main driver of the demand for connectivity, ISPs’ 
competitiveness relies more on content innovation than on the amount of content in 
itself. Remembering once again that it is dependent on CSPs that add value to the 
ISP’s product, the broadband connection, the non-neutral ISP has to balance between 
short-term gains and long-term effects on CSP participation and innovation. 
5. Theoretical Effects of Network Neutrality 
In this section, I examine the theoretical predictions of the welfare effects of network 
neutrality. First, I review five notable mathematical models that take differing angles 
to attack the puzzle. For the most part, I stick to my objective of presenting the basic 
layouts of the models, excluding any extensions that may be made in the latter parts 
of the papers. In the succeeding subsection, I tabulate the welfare predictions of all the 
prominent models. Lastly, I discuss the policy implications. 
5.1 Models of the Market 
Network neutrality only began to emerge as a topic in economics 10 years ago. The 
vast majority of the formal models are from the last five years. Capturing all the aspects 
of network neutrality in a model is highly difficult if not downright impossible. The 
biggest weakness of most models is the simplistic formalization of the regulatory 
frameworks that loses the subtleties of the issue. An example is the lack of 
distinguishing between discriminatory and non-discriminatory termination pricing. 
This poses a danger of omitting dynamics arising in a two-sided market, even when the 
model is mathematically advanced. Another important factor affecting the real-world 
market outcome is the diversity of CSPs. This is also reflected in the models, in which 
the asymmetry of CSPs is by far the most commonly encountered parameter type 
affecting the welfare results (e.g. Altman et al. 2014; Cheng et al. 2011; Choi and Kim 
2010; Economides and Tåg 2013; Guo et al. 2013; Kourandi et al. 2014; Krämer and 
Wiewiorra 2012; Mialon and Banerjee 2014; Musacchio et al. 2009; Njoroge et al. 2013; 
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Reggiani and Valletti 2012). In many models, the welfare effect also depends on the 
location on the price axis, that is, the termination or subscription fees. 
The majority of the models in the literature specify a monopolistic ISP or a duopoly, 
two or a continuum of CSPs, and a continuum of end users (cf. the Hotelling model). 
On the other hand, the mathematical approaches to modeling the demand for 
connectivity or utility from content differ significantly across authors. Most models 
give qualitative rather than quantitative predictions of economic efficiency under 
neutrality and non-neutrality, with certain exceptions such as Guo et al. (2012), Lee 
and Kim (2014), and Nurski (2014). I believe that the limitations in each model make 
a “meta-analysis” of the models all the more important for policy analysis, however 
sophisticated each model may be in their own right. 
Economides and Tåg (2012). Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-Sided Market 
Analysis 
Economides and Tåg’s model is a natural starting point, attractive in its relative 
mathematical elegance and tractability. The authors first treat the ISP as a 
monopolistic platform operator between end users and CSPs. They specify a Hotelling 
model with a continuum of both end users and CSPs with differing valuation 
parameters. The two groups exert positive externalities on each other. Utility to end 
user ݅ from connecting to the Internet is 
 ݑ௜ = ݒ + ܾ݊௖௦௣௘ − ݐݔ௜ − ݌, (4)
and the marginal user indifferent between connecting and not connecting to the 
Internet using the given connection is located at 
 ݔ௜ = ݒ + ܾ݊௖௦௣௘ − ݌ݐ . (5)
The marginal CSP indifferent about entering the market is located at 
 ݕ௝ = ܽ݊௨௘ − ݏ݂ . (6)
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Here, ݌ is the subscription fee and ݏ the termination fee. ݒ is the base intrinsic value 
to users from connecting to the Internet, ܾ is the marginal value of an additional unit 
of content to the user, and ݐ is their unit transportation cost. ݂  is a parameter denoting 
the common part of CSPs’ fixed costs, and ܽ is the marginal value of an additional 
user to CSPs. ݊ ௖௦௣௘  and ݊ ௨௘  denote the expected number of CSPs and users, respectively. 
Assuming fulfilled expectations, we have ݊௨ = ݔ௜ and ݊௖௦௣ = ݕ௜ , ݊௨ (݊௖௦௣) denoting the 
number of users (CSPs) participating in the market. Solving the system of simultaneous 
equations (5) and (6), Economides and Tåg proceed to write the demand for 
connectivity as a function of the subscription and termination fees: 
 ݊௨(݌, ݏ) = ݂(ݒ − ݌) − ܾݏ݂ݐ − ܾܽ . (7)
Analogously, the supply of CSPs is given by 
 ݊௖௦௣(݌, ݏ) = ܽ(ݒ − ݌) − ݐݏ݂ݐ − ܾܽ . (8)
The monopolist chooses ݌ and ݏ simultaneously to maximize profit. The monopolist’s 
problem is 
 max௣,௦ ߎ௜௦௣(݌, ݏ) = (݌ − ܿ)݊௨(݌, ݏ) + ݏ݊௖௦௣(݌, ݏ), (9)
which yields 
 ݌ = (2݂ݐ − ܾܽ)(ݒ + ܿ) − ܾଶܿ − ܽଶݒ4݂ݐ − (ܽ + ܾ)ଶ  (10)
and 
 ݏ = ݂(ܽ − ܾ)(ݒ − ܿ)4݂ݐ − (ܽ + ܾ)ଶ . (11)
End-users’ surplus is calculated as 
 ܥܵ(݌, ݏ) = න [ݒ + ܾ݊௨(݌, ݏ) − ݐݔ − ݌]dݔ௡ೠ(௣,௦)
଴
, (12)
and CSPs’ total profits are 
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 ߎ௖௦௣ = න [ܽ݊௨(݌, ݏ) − ݂ݕ − ݏ]dݕ௡೎ೞ೛(௣,௦)
଴
. (13)
Due to the positive network effects, the social planner would actually want to set ݌ < ܿ 
and ݏ < 0, i.e. a subscription fee below marginal cost, and a negative termination fee. 
An intuitive insight from the analysis is that under non-neutrality, the ISP, which aims 
to maximize its profits, will charge CSPs a positive fee if they value access to additional 
users more than users value access to additional CSPs. Therefore, the relative size of 
the cross-group externalities, ܽ/ܾ, is of interest, as it influences the prices the ISP 
charges. Neutrality in the form of the zero-price rule is reflected in the model as the 
simple constraint ݏ = 0. 
Economides and Tåg evaluate the static welfare effects of the zero-price rule, namely, 
user, ISP, CSP, and total surplus. They also extend the analysis to a duopolistic setting 
between two ISPs, which yields outcomes similar to the monopoly case. Overall, their 
findings would indicate that in most cases neutrality regulation increases total surplus 
through the increase in the total CSP profits. For most parameter values, however, 
end users are actually better off under non-neutrality. As the authors put it, “The 
intuition is that in [non-neutral] monopoly, consumers benefit from a lower subscription 
price since the monopolist has incentives to attract more consumers to generate extra 
revenue from charging content providers.” This model does not consider congestion or 
data discrimination. 
Hermalin and Katz (2007). The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an 
Application to the Network Neutrality Debate 
From 2007, Hermalin and Katz’s study is the very first mathematical model of network 
neutrality, to my knowledge. The authors treat neutrality as a form of product-line 
restriction. Specifically, under neutrality, the ISP is not allowed to tier its broadband 
service based on different QoS to different CSPs. In the model, there is an ISP 
monopoly and continuums of end users and CSPs with unit masses. CSPs come in two 
types, ߠ ∈ [0, ̅ߠ] ≡ ߆, with end users valuing the latter type more than the former, 
distributed according the cumulative distribution function ܨ(∙) and probability density 
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function ݂(∙). The ISP, who does not observe the type of a given CSP but only knows 
the general distribution, charges end users subscription (“hookup”) fee ℎ and CSPs 
interconnection fee ݌(ݍ); ݍ denotes QoS, and ݍ = 0 is used to indicate that the CSP is 
not connected to the platform. When connected, ݍ > 0 is the minimum QoS the ISP 
provides. 
Hermalin and Katz specify two alternative business models for CSPs: A membership-
fee model, where CSPs charge end users membership fee ݐ, and an ad-supported model, 
where advertisers pay ܽ per unit of end-user demand to CSPs, which offer their service 
to end users free of charge. A fee-charging CSP sets 
 ݐ = arg max
௧
ߠݍ(ݐ − ݇)݀(ݐ) , (14)
and a CSP’s maximal profit is 
 ߎ௖௦௣ = ߠݍߩ , (15)
where ߩ = (ݐ∗ − ݇)݀(ݐ∗) with the membership-fee model, and ߩ = (ܽ − ݇)݀(0) with the 
ad-supported model. 
End-user utility is quasi-linear, given by 
 ܷ = න න ݑ ൬ ݖ
ߠݍ(ߠ)൰݂(ߠ)dݖdߠ + ݕ௫(ఏ)଴௵ , (16)
where ݔ(ߠ) is end-user demand for each type-ߠ CSP and ݕ is the amount of the 
composite good consumed. End-user surplus from consuming all CSPs’ content is given 
by 
 ܥܵ = ߪනߠݍ(ߠ)݂(ߠ)dߠ
௵
, (17)
where ߪ = ∫ ݀(ݖ)dݖஶ௧∗  with membership-fee CSPs, and ߪ = ∫ ݀(ݖ)dݖஶ଴  with ad-
supported CSPs. 
The timing in the model goes so that the ISP first chooses ℎ and ݌(ݍ), after which 
CSPs choose ݍ and ݐ. Finally, end users observe ℎ, ݍ, and ݐ, and decide whether to 
connect and how much to consume content from each CSP. Noting that to satisfy the 
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profit-maximization, incentive-compatibility, and individual-rationality criteria, the 
unrestricted, non-neutral ISP sets ݌[ݍ(ߠ)] = ߩߠݍ(ߠ) − ∫ ߩݍ(߬)d߬ఏ଴ , Hermalin and Katz 
write down the ISP’s problem as 
 
max
௤(ఏ) න {(ߩ + ߪ)ߠݍ(ߠ) −න ߩݍ(߬)d߬ − ܿ[ݍ(ߠ)]}݂(ߠ)dߠఏ଴ఏഥ଴  s. t.ݍ ≤ ݍ(ߠᇱ) ≤ ݍ(ߠ) (18)
using also the fact that end users are homogenous so that the ISP captures their entire 
surplus with ℎ. 
Neutrality regulation means restricting the ISP to offering only a single quality level, 
ݍ௥. Now, the authors remark, “[T]here is a marginal [CSP] type just indifferent between 
connecting and not. Rather than view the [ISP’s] problem as one of choosing an optimal 
quality and price, we can view it as one of choosing an optimal cutoff type and quality.” 
The restricted, neutral ISP’s problem then becomes 
 max
௤,ఏ න [ߩߠݍ + ߪ߬ݍ − ܿ(ݍ)]݂(߬)d߬ఏഥఏ . (19)
Hermalin and Katz identify three welfare-effect channels for a product-line restriction. 
First, the exclusion effect reduces total welfare by reducing the number of active CSPs, 
ceteris paribus. Second, the reduced-quality effect reduces total welfare by reducing the 
highest available QoS. Third, the improved-quality effect increases total welfare by 
increasing QoS for some CSP types. The net welfare effect of neutrality regulation is 
ambiguous. However, the authors show that for neutrality regulation to improve 
welfare, the marginal CSP type should enjoy much higher QoS than what it would get 
under non-neutrality. The conclusion is that, for conservative parameter values, 
neutrality regulation as a product-line restriction tends to reduce total welfare. 
Musacchio et al. (2009). A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment 
Incentives with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue 
Musacchio et al.’s model differs from the rest of the literature in that it models 
monopolistic competition among many ISPs. The authors include multiple ISPs in their 
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model to describe a potential free-riding scenario among non-neutral ISPs where “an 
ISP can increase [its] price to [CSPs] and enjoy the additional revenue this increase 
causes, while the downside of inducing the [CSP] to invest less has to be borne by all 
of the ISPs.” Musacchio et al. treat end users, ISPs, and CSPs as countable rather than 
continuously distributed on an interval. There are ܯ CSPs and ܰ ISPs. Each ISP ௡ܶ 
is connected to a set of end users, ௡ܷ, has monopoly power over them, and charges 
them subscription fee ݌௡ for each “click,” which acts as the unit of demand from the 
end-user side. CSPs receive ad revenue ܽ per click. Under non-neutrality, each ISP 
charges each CSP ܥ௠ termination fee ݍ௡ per click. Infrastructure and innovation 
investment by the CSP and ISP are denoted by ܿ௠ and ݐ௡, respectively. ܿ௠௩  (ݐ௡௪) is the 
value of CSP ܥ௠’s (ISP ௡ܶ’s) investment perceived by the average end user. In the 
special symmetric case where the total CSP (ISP) investment is split equally between 
each CSP (ISP), i.e. ܿ௠ = ܿ/ܯ (ݐ௡ = ݐ/ܰ), the total rate of clicks to CSP ܥ௠ is 
 ܦ௠ = ൬ 1ܯ௩ ܿ௩ݐ௪൰݁ି௣/ఏ, (20)
and the total rate of clicks through ISP ௡ܶ is 
 ܤ௡ = ൬ 1ܰ ܯଵି௩ܿ௩ݐ௪൰݁ି௣/ఏ, (21)
where ߠ is a parameter reflecting end users’ price elasticity, ݁ ି௣/ఏ being a normalization 
factor. More generally, ܦ௠ = ∑ ܴ௠௡௡ ≡ ௖೘ೡ௖భೡା⋯ା௖೘ೡ ܤ௡. Both ܦ௠ and ܤ௡ are increasing and 
concave in ݐ and ܿ. The difference between them is that the latter is increasing in ܯ 
but the former does not increase with ܰ. In other words, end users value variety in 
content, whereas the number of ISPs does not add to their utility. 
CSP surplus is 
 ߎ஼೘ = ෍(ܽ − ݍ௡)ܴ௠௡ே
௡ୀଵ
− ߚܿ௠, (22)
where ߚ > 1 represents the CSP’s opportunity cost. ISP profit is 
 ߎ ೙் = (݌௡ + ݍ௡)ܤ௡ − ߙݐ௡, (23)
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where ߙ > 1 represents the ISP’s opportunity cost. 
Like Economides and Tåg, Musacchio et al. define neutrality as the zero-price rule. 
Under neutrality, ISPs first choose (ݐ௡ ,݌௡) simultaneously; under non-neutrality, they 
can set (ݐ௡ ,݌௡ , ݍ௡). In the second stage, CSPs choose ܿ௠. Solving for the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium, Musacchio et al. arrive at 
 ݌௡ = ݌଴ ≡ ߠܰ(1 − ݒ)ܰ(1 − ݒ) + ݒ (24)
under neutrality. Under non-neutrality, ISPs set 
 ݌௡ = ݌ ≡ ߠ − ܽ (25)
and 
 ݍ௡ = ݍ ≡ ܽ − ߠ ݒܰ(1 − ݒ) + ݒ . (26)
The authors solve analytically for ܿ௠, ݐ௡, click rates and CSP, ISP, and end-user 
surplus, which they calculate by taking the integral of the total click rate function, the 
proxy for end-user demand, from the equilibrium price to infinity. They find that the 
ISP free-riding scenario is realized, and ISPs tend to overcharge CSPs in the non-
neutral equilibrium. This reduces CSP investment. Still, as CSPs make their 
investment decisions only after ISPs have committed to their pricing decisions, they 
retain some surplus. The surpluses depend on ܰ  and the relative values of ܽ and ߠ, i.e. 
the ratio of ad revenue per click to the price sensitivity of end users. In Figure 11, 
Musacchio et al. plot the dependence of the relative welfare levels under the two regimes 
on ܰ and ܽ. It can be seen that the total welfare effect of neutrality is in general 
ambiguous. For the intermediate range of ܽ/ߠ, the neutral regime is welfare-superior. 
Musacchio et al. leave congestion and data discrimination out of their model. 
Figure 11. Total welfare superiority boundaries. In Musacchio et al.’s model, the neutral 
regime is welfare-superior for intermediate ad-revenue values, whereas the non-neutral regime 
dominates for small or large ad-revenue values. Source: Musacchio et al. (2009). 
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Choi and Kim (2010). Net Neutrality and Investment Incentives 
Contrary to Economides and Tåg and Musacchio et al., Choi and Kim approach 
neutrality from the data-discrimination perspective to evaluate the effects of QoS 
tiering on both static welfare and the agents’ investment incentives. Their setting 
corresponds to the NNN regime but with no throttling allowed. They specify a 
monopolistic ISP, two CSPs, and a continuum of end users. The ISP charges end users, 
whose total mass is one, subscription fee ܽ . End users demand content from CSP 1 and 
CSP 2 with market shares ߪଵ and ߪଶ at request rate ߣ. End users are dispersed over a 
Hotelling line with CSP 1 at one end and CSP 2 at the other. The unit transportation 
cost is denoted by ݐ as in Economides and Tåg’s model. Users’ utility function is simply 
ݑ(ߣ) = ݒ. CSP ݅ generates revenue stream ݎ௜ and incurs marginal cost ܿ௜ per request 
(or “click” as in Musacchio et al., if you will); ݅ ’s markup is ݉௜ ≡ ݎ௜ − ܿ௜, and ݉ଵ ≥ ݉ଶ. 
This means that the two CSPs can be asymmetric in either their revenues or costs or 
both. Incorporating congestion in their model, Choi and Kim denote the ISP’s capacity 
as ߤ. The service time is exponentially distributed with a mean of 1/ߤ. The authors 
treat ߤ as exogenous in the short run and endogenous in the long run. The network is 
modeled as an M/M/1 system, so in the neutral network the waiting time is ݓ ≡ ଵ
ఓିఒ
. 
In the non-neutral network, priority-lane packets wait for ݓଵ ≡
ଵ
ఓିఒభ
 and slow-lane 
packets for ݓଶ ≡ ݓଵ
ଵ
ఓିఒభ
. We then have ݓଶ > ݓ > ݓଵ when ߤ > ߣ. 
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Choi and Kim start with a symmetric scenario where the CSPs split the market equally. 
The game to be solved for an SPE by backward induction goes so that, in the non-
neutral case, the ISP first contracts on the priority lane with one of the CSPs, after 
which it sets the subscription fee. Then, end users choose their CSPs. The ISP 
delightingly straightforwardly maximizes ߨ௠ = ܽ, although subject to the condition 
that the market is wholly covered. The ISP’s profit, that is, the subscription fee in the 
neutral equilibrium is 
 ߨ௠∗ = ܽ∗ = ݒ − 1(ߤ − ߣ) − ݐ2 , (27)
and CSP ݅’s profit is 
 ߨ௜∗ = ݉௜2 ߣ. (28)
In the non-neutral case, the ISP maximizes ߨ௠ = ෤ܽ + ݂, where ݂ the termination fee 
extracted from CSP 1, assumed to be the one to get the priority lane. Choi and Kim 
do not place restrictions on the trading or auction mechanism that determines ݂, but 
use ߠ to represent the ISP’s bargaining power. It is derived that ݂ = (݉ଶ +
ߠΔ௠)(2ݔ෤ − 1)ߣ, where ݔ෤ denotes the indifferent user’s location, and Δ௠ ≡ ݉ଵ −݉ଶ. 
The ISP’s maximal profit under non-neutrality is 
 ߨ෤௠∗ = ݒ − 1(ߤ − ݔ෤ߣ) − ݐݔ෤ + ݂. (29)
Getting the priority lane also leads to a higher market share for CSP 1 so that ߪଵ >
ଵ
ଶ
> ߪଶ. Since customers’ switching from CSP 2 to CSP 1 forms a positive feedback 
loop, Choi and Kim make the assumption of sufficient differentiation of content so that 
ߪଶ > 0 and that an interior solution exists. CSPs’ profits under non-neutrality are given 
by 
 ߨ෤௜∗ = ൜ ݉ଵݔ෤ߣ − ݂,  ݅ = 1݉ଶ(1 − ݔ෤)ߣ,  ݅ = 2 . (30)
When ݉ଵ = ݉ଶ, i.e. the CSPs are symmetric, their profits are equal and independent 
of ߠ. 
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The output of Choi and Kim’s basic model as far as static efficiency is concerned is 
that while subscription fee ܽ  decreases under non-neutrality, ݂  may compensate for the 
loss to the ISP. The authors find that ߨ෤௠∗ > ߨ௠∗ , i.e. the ISP prefers the non-neutral 
regime, if ݉ଵ and ݉ଶ are relatively high. If the CSPs’ markups are asymmetric, the 
ISP’s preference between the two regimes depends on its bargaining power ߠ. The low-
markup CSP 2 is always worse off under non-neutrality. If CSP 1’s markup exceeds 
that of CSP 2 substantially enough, CSP 1 benefits from the priority lane compared to 
the neutral case. The higher ߠ, the larger the markup differential has to be for CSP 1 
to prefer the non-neutral regime. End users are better off under non-neutrality. The 
authors remind that “an individual consumer’s surplus increases linearly with the 
distance of her location from the marginal consumer who is indifferent between the two 
[CSPs].” Finally, due to there being no demand effects from pricing, the total welfare 
effect from a change of regime is composed of the CSPs’ markups and users’ 
transportation and delay costs. The markups are higher, as are transportation costs, 
while delay costs are unchanged. The irrelevance of delay costs for static efficiency 
reflects the fixed capacity constraint – binding under both regimes – meaning that the 
average service time is unchanged. If the markup differential is large enough relative 
to transportation costs, non-neutrality is welfare-superior in the static universe. 
Moving to a dynamic framework, Choi and Kim evaluate the dynamic effects on ISP 
investment and CSP innovation. To see the ISP’s incentives to invest in capacity 
expansion under the two regimes, they do away with the exogeneity of ߤ, with respect 
to which they now take the derivative of the ISP’s profit functions. Evaluating ௗగ೘
ௗఓ
 and 
ௗగ೘
ௗఓ
 (taking into account the ISP’s capacity provisioning costs), Choi and Kim identify 
two channels through which capacity expansion affects the ISP’s profits: (i) the network 
access fee effect on the demand side and (ii) the rent-extraction effect on the supply 
side. Under neutrality, capacity expansion increases the connection speed in a uniform 
fashion, allowing the ISP to charge a higher subscription fee. The network access fee 
effect is ambiguous in the non-neutral case, where capacity expansion benefits CSP 2 
customers with the slow lane relatively more, but on the other hand reduces the 
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marginal CSP 1 customers’ transportation costs. The rent-extraction effect refers to 
the fact that as capacity increases, the benefit from the priority lane for CSP 1 becomes 
smaller, thus having a negative effect on the ISP’s investment incentives under non-
neutrality. On the other hand, when CSPs’ dynamic behavior is included in the 
equation, full rent extraction is not optimal for the ISP in the long run anyway. The 
net investment effect is ambiguous, but the identification of the effect channels in the 
model would allow testing for the net effect with different parameter values. A priori, 
it would seem that a positive investment effect is more likely than not under neutrality. 
Choi and Kim also address CSPs’ innovation incentives, representing investment in 
markup-increasing technology as increasing and convex in the magnitude of the 
resulting increase in the markup. CSPs invest to the point where the marginal benefit 
from the markup increase equals marginal cost. The non-neutral case is complicated 
by the fact that the benefit depends on whether or not the CSP gets the priority lane, 
which is only known ex post. The pure strategy equilibria conditions under non-
neutrality are such that while the individual CSPs’ strategies can differ across the 
equilibria, total CSP investment remains constant. The takeaway is that, under non-
neutrality, the high-markup CSP 1 will choose to invest less than under neutrality in 
innovative technology when the ISP’s bargaining power ߠ is relatively high, whereas 
the low-markup CSP 2 will always invest less than under neutrality. Hence, neutrality 
regulation would seem beneficial in terms of CSP innovation. 
Njoroge et al. (2013). Investment in Two-Sided Markets and the Net Neutrality Debate 
Njoroge et al. take a dynamic modeling approach to zoom in on the effects of neutrality 
regulation on ISP investment and CSP innovation. They use CSP market coverage (or 
CSP participation) as a proxy for CSP innovation. In their game-theoretic formulation, 
Njoroge et al. specify an ISP duopoly with continuums of end users and CSPs. User ݅’s 
utility function in connecting to the Internet has the form 
 ௜ܷ൫߮(݅)൯ = ݉ܽݔ {0,ܴ + ߠ௜ܨ௜൫ݕఝ(௜),ݕఝ(ି௜), ̅ߛ, ܽ, ݎఈ, ݎఉ൯ − ݌ఝ(௜)}. (31)
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߮: [0,݂] → {ߙ,ߚ}, where ݂ ∈ [0,1] is the mass of a continuum of users, maps users’ ISP 
choices; ߮(݅) is the ISP user ݅ chooses out of the two. In words, a fraction of 0 to ݂ of 
the users chooses ISP ߙ while the rest choose ISP ߚ. ݎఈ and ݎఉ (ݍఈ and ݍఉ) are then the 
realized masses of users (CSPs) joining platform ߙ and ߚ, respectively. ܴ is users’ 
common reservation utility, and ߠ௜ is user ݅’s individual preference parameter, drawn 
from a uniform distribution on [0,݂] – again a standard Hotelling formulation. ܨ௜ is 
user ݅’s utility from using ISP ߮(݅), ݕఝ(௜) is QoS with ISP ߮(݅), ݕఝ(ି௜) is QoS with the 
other ISP, and ݎఈ (ݎఉ) is the fraction of CSPs which connects to ISP ߙ (ISP ߚ). ݌ఝ(௜) 
is the subscription fee charged by ISP ߮(݅). [̅ߛ − ܽ, ̅ߛ + ܽ] is the support (roughly, the 
range of possible values) of the uniform distribution of CSP quality, so ܽ/̅ߛ can be 
interpreted as the coefficient of variation in quality. 
CSP ݆’s profit from connecting to platform ො߮(݆) is 
 ݒ௝ = ݃൫ߛ௝ ,ߛఝෝ(௝)൯ݍఈ + ݃൫ߛ௝ , ߛఉ൯ݍఉ −ݓఝෝ (௝), (32)
where the first two terms are the gross revenue, and ݓఝෝ(௝) is the termination fee charged 
by ISP ො߮(݆). ݃൫ߛ௝ ,ߛఝෝ(௝)൯ represents ad prices, increasing in both QoS and the CSP’s 
quality. 
The profit of ISP ݖ ∈ {ߙ,ߚ} is 
 ߨ௭ = ݌௭ݍ௭ + ݓ௭ݎ௭ − ܫ(ݕ௭), (33)
where ܫ(ݕ௭) is the investment cost to achieve QoS ݕ௭, increasing and convex in QoS. 
In the six-stage game, as compared to Musacchio et al.’s and Choi and Kim’s two- and 
three-stage games, ISPs first simultaneously choose their QoS, after which they set the 
termination fees. Next, CSPs make their ISP choices. Then, the ISPs simultaneously 
proceed to set subscription fees to users, who decide which platform to join after 
observing the subscription fees. Finally, users choose which CSPs to use. Neutrality is 
represented in the model so that CSP ݆ connected to platform ො߮(݆) has equal access to 
both platforms’ users and, conversely, user ݅ connected to platform ߮(݅) has access to 
all CSPs. This is not true in the non-neutral case. There, the CSP connecting to ISP ݖ 
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has to pay for an enhanced quality level ߛ௭ > ߛ௕௔௦௜௖ (priority lanes) or, in the “walled-
garden” scenario, access in the first place: ߛ௕௔௦௜௖ = 0. In the neutral walled garden, ISPs 
offer only one type of connectivity at QoS ߛ௭. The non-neutral walled garden is 
equivalent to a uniform termination pricing policy (weak content-provider neutrality) 
under the NNN regime, whereas the priority-lanes regime is equivalent to a 
discriminatory termination pricing policy. 
Similarly to Choi and Kim’s model, Njoroge et al. solve the game for the SPE by 
backward induction. In the priority-lanes case, they do this numerically for the first 
two stages. Congestion is explicitly if rather simplistically accounted for in their model, 
reflected as a decrease in consumer utility as the number of CSPs connected to the 
platform increases ceteris paribus. In contrast to Economides and Tåg’s model, users 
gain utility from the quality, not quantity of CSPs. Recall how this modeling choice 
actually resonates with Section 3.4’s analysis of the supply and demand for Internet 
content. Here, ISPs can also add utility-increasing features to the platforms. The 
aforementioned tradeoff between surplus extraction using differential pricing tactics on 
end users and expropriation of profit from CSPs in the form of termination fees becomes 
apparent in this model. 
Njoroge et al. give predictions of the effects of neutrality regulation on ISP investment, 
CSP participation, end-user surplus, ISP surplus, and total welfare. The numerical 
welfare results of the augmented scenarios in the latter part of their paper should not 
be mistaken for quantitative effect-size predictions: The cardinal utility levels are not 
meaningful as such, but only through their ordering. They conclude that the non-
neutral ISPs invest more than their neutral counterparts do because of increased 
market power and profit, which increases end-user, CSP, and total surplus at the end 
of the day. However, the flipside of the coin is that increased market power allows the 
ISP to raise termination fees, which decreases CSP participation and reduces end-user, 
CSP, and total surpluses. The net welfare effect of neutrality regulation depends on 
the relative sizes of the effects, but has the tendency to be negative. Figure 12 displays 
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Njoroge et al.’s modeling outcomes with different parameter values insofar as CSP 
participation is concerned. 
Figure 12. CSP market coverage. Njoroge et al. graph CSP market coverage as a function 
of the reciprocal of CSP heterogeneity (̅ߛ/ܽ) and the demand for connectivity as measured by 
the mass of end users (݂). Lighter regions reflect higher CSP participation. In regions ܴଵ and 
ܴଶ, the CSP market is uncovered, whereas in regions ܴଷ, ܴସ, and ܴହ, all CSPs connect to at 
least one of the platforms. In ܴହ, all CSPs connect to both platforms. The level of CSP 
participation is inversely proportional to end-user participation and CSP heterogeneity: High 
consumer participation and CSP heterogeneity induce the ISPs to extract consumer and CSP 
surplus by differentiating their QoS and raising the termination fees they charge the more 
inelastic CSPs, hindering the CSPs’ incentives to participate in the market. Source: Njoroge et 
al. (2013). 
 
5.2 Efficiency and Welfare 
The theoretical models related to network neutrality provide predictions of the welfare 
effects of neutrality. They consider short-run static efficiency and long-run dynamic 
efficiency. More specifically, economic efficiency can be divided into three classes: (i) 
static efficiency, (ii) investment efficiency, and (iii) innovation efficiency (Faulhaber 
2011). Investment and innovation efficiency are dynamic in nature, as they are only 
realized over time. These are more difficult to model than static efficiency, a fact 
manifested as only a portion of the models providing results on the dynamic effects. 
Table 2 presents a “meta-analysis” of the welfare predictions of virtually all the 
published models I have been able to find. In total, I include the predictions of 28 
formal models from 2007 to 2014. The effect categories evaluated are end-user, ISP, 
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CSP, and social surpluses, which correspond to static efficiency, and ISP investment 
and CSP innovation, which reflect dynamic efficiency. 
Looking at Table 2, it would appear that the predictions of the welfare effects of 
neutrality regulation, as defined by either a termination-fee cap or no paid 
prioritization, are mixed. When the predictions are aggregated over the models, 
network neutrality can be perceived to affect the economic welfare of agents in the 
following way: 
End-user surplus: Ambiguous/negative 
ISP surplus: Negative 
CSP surplus: Positive 
Total welfare: Ambiguous/negative 
ISP investment: Negative 
CSP innovation: Ambiguous. 
Table 2. Welfare effects of network neutrality. The table lists 28 models’ predictions of 
the welfare effects of network neutrality as defined by either a termination-fee cap (“Z”) or no 
paid prioritization (“D,Z”). “+” (“–”) denotes an increase (decrease) in the metric under 
neutrality for at least some parameter values and no decrease (increase) for any parameter 
value. “0” denotes no change in the metric. “?” denotes that the metric is not evaluated. “⋆” 
denotes that the change in the metric is ambiguous. “+⋆” (“–⋆”) denotes that while the change 
in the metric depends on parameter values, it generally tends to be positive (negative). The 
“NN OK?” field has “Yes” (“No”) if the overall stance of the article is supportive of (against) 
network neutrality, or “?” if no such stance can be identified. Adapted, expanded, and corrected 
from Altman et al. (2012). Sources: 
ARWHX = Altman et al. (2014) 
B = Baranes (2014) 
BKV= Bourreau et al. (2014) 
C = Cañón (2009) 
CBG = Cheng et al. (2011) 
CJK1/2 = Choi et al. (2014a)/(2014b) 
CK = Choi and Kim (2010) 
DR = D’Annunzio and Russo (2013) 
EH = Economides and Hermalin (2012) 
ET1/2 = Economides and Tåg (2012)/(2013) 
G = Gans (2014) 
GBCY = Guo et al. (2010) 
GCB1/2 = Guo et al. (2012)/(2013) 
HCCR = Hande et al. (2009) 
HK = Hermalin and Katz (2007) 
JH = Jamison and Hauge (2008) 
KKV = Kourandi et al. (2014) 
KW = Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012) 
MB = Mialon and Banerjee (2014) 
MSW = Musacchio et al. (2009) 
NOSW = Njoroge et al. (2013) 
PS = Peitz and Schuett (2013) 
RV = Reggiani and Valletti (2012) 
S = Shrimali (2008) 
WS = Wang and Sun (2012) 
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Model Market Structure NN Definition Congestion 
End-User 
Surplus 
ISP 
Surplus 
CSP 
Surplus 
Total 
Welfare 
ISP 
Investment 
CSP 
Innovation 
NN 
OK? # ISPs # CSPs 
ARWHX 1 Many Z Yes +⋆ +⋆ +⋆ +⋆ ? ? Yes 
B 1 2 D,Z No – –⋆ –⋆ –⋆ – ? No 
BKV 2 Many D,Z Yes ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ – – – No 
C 1 Many Z No + – + + – + Yes 
CBG 1 2 D,Z Yes –⋆ – + –⋆ + ? No 
CJK1 1 Many D,Z Yes ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ –⋆ +⋆ –⋆ Yes 
CJK2 1/2 Many D,Z No –⋆ – ⋆ +⋆ ? ? Yes 
CK 1 2 D,Z Yes – ⋆ +⋆ ⋆ +⋆ ⋆ ? 
DR 1/2 2 Z No + – + + ? ? Yes 
EH 1 Many D,Z Yes + – + + – ? Yes 
ET1 1/2 Many Z No ⋆ ⋆ + ⋆ ? ? ? 
ET2 1 2 D,Z No ⋆ – ⋆ ⋆ – ? ? 
G 1 2 D,Z No 0 – + 0 0 + Yes 
GBCY 1 2 D,Z Yes – – + – ? ? No 
GCB1 1 2 D,Z Yes – – +⋆ – – +⋆ No 
GCB2 1 2 D,Z Yes ⋆ – +⋆ –⋆ ? ? No 
HCCR 1/Many Many Z Yes –⋆ – ⋆ –⋆ ? ? No 
HK1 1/2 Many D,Z No –⋆ –⋆ ⋆ –⋆ ? ? No 
KKV 2 2 D,Z No +⋆ – + +⋆ ? ? ? 
JH 1 Many D,Z Yes – – + – – – No 
KW 1 Many D,Z Yes 0 – + – – –⋆ No 
MB 1 Many Z No ⋆ –⋆ +⋆ ⋆ ? ? ? 
MSW Many Many Z No ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ⋆ ? 
NOSW 2 Many D,Z Yes –⋆ ⋆ –⋆ –⋆ – –⋆ No 
PS 1 Many D,Z Yes –⋆ –⋆ ⋆ –⋆ ? ? No 
RV 1 Many D,Z Yes –⋆ –⋆ – –⋆ –⋆ ⋆ No 
S 1 2 D,Z No + – ⋆ + – – Yes 
WS 1 1 D,Z Yes ⋆ – +⋆ ⋆ ? ⋆ ? 
Aggregate Prediction –⋆ – + –⋆ – ⋆ No? 
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In general, the literature on price discrimination finds its effects somewhat ambiguous 
but with a tendency to be welfare-enhancing (Kulick and Weisman 2010). The 
literature on network neutrality, which can be treated as a form of price discrimination, 
continues along a similar path. Indeed, economists are clearly cautious about network 
neutrality, and the aggregate sentiment toward neutrality can be condensed as 
ambiguous-to-negative. A noteworthy remark is that the few models that define 
neutrality solely as the zero-price rule give ambiguous-to-positive total-welfare 
predictions; still, the sample size is too small for clear conclusions. Models generally 
agree with the intuition that ISPs are the gainers from deregulation, whereas CSPs are 
the losers, end users’ position being more ambiguous. We can conclude that if the 
regulator is a total-welfare maximizer, economic theory is inclined against neutrality 
regulation. If the regulator is biased toward consumers, neutrality regulation still has 
no theoretical backing. The predicted ambiguous-to-negative dynamic effects of 
neutrality on ISP investment and CSP innovation can be taken to complement the 
ambiguous-to-negative static effects. 
Based on the models, then, the effect of neutrality regulation on end-user surplus is 
ambiguous but more likely to be negative than positive. In many models, the negative 
effect results from higher subscription fees under neutrality due to the ISP not being 
able to allocate revenue extraction onto the supply side. The dynamic models would 
together indicate higher ISP investment under non-neutrality, which contributes to 
higher QoS and, consequently, end-user surplus. On the other hand, some models 
predict that termination pricing has also a negative impact channel on end-user surplus 
through reduced CSP participation and a lower amount of content available to end 
users. Moreover, some models predict that differential pricing allows the ISP to extract 
more of end users’ surplus, as discussed earlier. In the aggregate, the negative end-user-
surplus effect channels of neutrality regulation outweigh the positive ones. 
Prima facie, the welfare effects of neutrality regulation on the ISP seem clear-cut. 
Under non-neutrality, the ISP would have the option to charge customers on both sides 
of the market, force CSPs to internalize the negative congestion externality, and 
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practice differential pricing – clearly the value of this option cannot be negative? As 
said, most models confirm that the ISP stands to gain from deregulation. Under special 
circumstances, non-neutrality could conceivably shape the market in such a way that 
the total ISP revenue decreases, even if the ISP’s profit extraction becomes more 
efficient. If the cost reductions from network management are not sufficient to cover 
this revenue reduction, the ISP’s profit can decrease. In particular, the ISP can be 
harmed by deregulation if CSP participation in the market decreases substantially. 
CSP surplus is predicted to be higher under neutrality by the majority of the models. 
The logic here is quite straightforward, as termination fees are directly subtracted from 
CSPs’ profits. The possibility of total CSP surplus being higher under non-neutrality 
mainly emerges when CSPs are heterogeneous: CSPs purchasing a fast lane may benefit 
more from the preferential delivery than those stuck with the slow lane lose. 
Additionally, higher ISP investment and reduced overall congestion can contribute to 
higher total CSP surplus. In general, the idea that smaller CSPs suffer more from non-
neutrality is corroborated by the models. 
All in all, based on this meta-analysis, the net total welfare effect of neutrality 
regulation appears to be negative, and in light of economic theory created so far, strong 
network neutrality should not be the basis for future regulation. However, as I hope to 
have shown, the neutrality question is infinitely more nuanced than a table of plus and 
minus signs. Indeed, this formal analysis concerns strong forms of neutrality, i.e. the 
zero-price rule and the prohibition of data discrimination, neglecting any intermediate 
degrees of regulation. It does not imply that all degrees of regulation are detrimental 
to economic welfare. In the next subsection, I evaluate some regulatory regimes in the 
middle of the spectrum. 
5.3 Policy Implications 
I now briefly discuss the practical policy implications of the analysis so far. Network 
non-neutrality, while definitely not necessarily detrimental to the market, has to be 
regarded as a potential issue that the regulator needs to recognize and assess. Policy 
  The Economic Effects of Network Neutrality 73 
decisions should ultimately be based on cost-benefit analysis. To set up the policy-
analysis mindset, we ask the following questions when considering the regulatory 
options (Joskow 2007): 
1) What is the magnitude of the problem? 
2) What policy instruments are available? 
3) How would regulation increase market performance? 
4) What are the side effects and costs of regulation? 
While I have analyzed these factors in the preceding text, the optimal degree of ISP 
regulation admittedly remains obscure. The optimum policy criterion itself is not easy 
to define. Even the first, supposedly trivial issue of determining the reference point for 
policy changes becomes difficult, as the status quo is not clearly either neutral or non-
neutral. Pareto efficiency, where no-one can be better off without someone being worse 
off, is quite unlikely to be achieved by any policy change, and still leaves distributional 
issues (who are the gainers and losers?) out of the equation. Strong neutrality clearly 
appears Pareto inefficient. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is a more pragmatic criterion, 
requiring that the parties better off could in theory compensate those worse off, and 
that Pareto efficiency could be achieved with some set of transfers (Hicks 1939; Kaldor 
1939). If, under neutrality, the increase in CSP or consumer surplus is larger than the 
decrease in ISP surplus, CSPs and end-users would be able to compensate ISPs, and 
the society would be better off. In effect, an increase in total welfare corresponds to a 
Kaldor-Hicks improvement. Distributional efficiency and any transfer costs are still left 
out of the equation. Policymakers have traditionally sympathized more with consumers 
than corporations. In any case, even if a consensus among economists emerges against 
all odds, an ideal solution will not probably be found amid all the political forces. 
Despite this, we can try to make some sense of the policy implications. 
Under neutrality, the ISP recovers its network costs from end users in the retail 
market.53 Under supply-side non-neutrality, the ISP recovers its costs from both CSPs 
and end users, even though the there is only one data stream flowing through the 
                                    
53 Network Neutrality in Europe. European Parliamentary Research Service briefing, 2014. 
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system. Whether this can be thought of as charging twice for the same thing depends 
on the sum of the fees charged to each side. Were the sum to remain fixed, equal to 
retail prices today, splitting the cost between the CSP and the end user would be 
merely reallocation, sound ethically tenable, and not reduce total welfare unless it had 
negative dynamic consequences. With discriminatory termination fees, CSPs internalize 
the negative congestion externality. Assuming a fixed total price in the two-sided 
market and no dynamic effects, usage-based pricing in the retail or wholesale market 
or both can be seen as equivalent scenarios with respect to total welfare. Now the 
choice of the specific regime would be reduced to a distributional issue, a 50-50 split 
between CSPs and end users being the simplest one. A total price cap is intended to 
prevent an excess inflation of the total revenue extracted by the ISP. 
The reality in its dynamics is more complex, however. The incentives and prices will 
change in response to regulation. The majority of economists appear to cast a wary eye 
toward enforcing a strict form neutrality, i.e. the NN regimes or the strictest extensions 
of the NRT regime, even though the zero-price rule is tempting in its simplicity, an 
obvious merit for any policy. At the other extreme, total deregulation is likewise 
tempting in its simplicity (Vogelsang 2013). Were the decision only between total 
regulation and deregulation, the rational social planner would be inclined to choose to 
deregulate. As far as the efficiency of the market outcome goes, however, not all middle-
road regimes can be ruled out as suboptimal. Hybrid regimes can come at the cost of 
complexity and, consequently, costs of implementation. Still, weak forms of neutrality, 
at the least, are worth considering. While certain government approaches such as 
placing additional taxes on ISPs or CSPs, or even taxing Internet users for each 
gigabyte transmitted54 are, to my belief, not warranted in any case, policy instruments 
potentially applicable to the broadband market are diverse. I cannot comment on the 
many of these, but restricting the context to neutrality regulation, I next assess some 
middle-road regulatory proposals. 
                                    
54 The Hungarian government recently planned to tax Internet users 150 forints (circa €0.50) per 
gigabyte, but this was not followed through. 
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The no-exclusivity rule would be equally simple and a better policy tool than the zero-
price rule (Kourandi et al. 2014) to prevent fragmentation. However, the no-exclusivity 
rule allows the ISP to discriminate CSPs through differential termination pricing even 
when it cannot directly exclude them. Intuitively, then, the no-exclusivity rule would 
appear to work best in combination with uniform termination pricing. Without network 
regulation, the no-exclusivity rule does not eliminate the possibility of tacit collusion 
between ISPs and CSPs where they implicitly coordinate on content priorities – the 
payment from the CSP to the ISP would be made in the form of direct interconnect 
deals, for example. 
Any cost-based regulatory approach to the broadband market poses significant 
challenges. One proposal is neutrality regulation in the form of regulated termination 
fees. The price regulation model could follow those in place in the electricity 
distribution markets. The regulator enforces a price cap such that termination fee ݂ ≤
ܯܥ + ܽ, i.e. only margin ܽ would be allowed over the marginal cost of bandwidth. 
Then, the termination fee is higher for data-intensive CSPs to reflect the ISP’s capacity 
provisioning costs. However, high sunk costs in the broadband market may render cost-
plus regulation infeasible (Hausman 1999; Sidak 2006). At the fundamental level, Owen 
and Rosston (2003) conclude: “[If] we assign property rights in access to users rather 
than suppliers, resulting in an efficient price of access (zero), there will be no long run 
supply of Internet services. […] While the benefits of the Internet can be made available 
to any particular user at zero cost, they cannot be made available to all users at zero 
cost.” Pricing at marginal cost may be statically efficient but falls short on dynamic 
efficiency. 
The most popular pricing rule in the telecommunications literature has been the 
efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), where the operator charges an 
interconnection fee equal to the incremental capacity provisioning costs plus an 
“opportunity cost” (Vogelsang 2003). The opportunity cost emerges from the possibility 
that the customer’s products and services displace the operator’s own, so the operator 
effectively facilitates competition against itself. Under special conditions, the ECPR 
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coincides with Ramsey pricing. The ECPR and its derivatives, however, have been 
criticized as either inefficient in most scenarios or too complicated when efficient 
(Vogelsang 2003). 
In addition to the theoretical obstacles with cost-plus regulation, immediate pragmatic 
difficulties arise with calculating costs in sufficiently general terms (Section 3.3). 
Moreover, the trickiness of cost accounting in telecommunications makes the optimal 
tuning of cost-plus regulation challenging. As the OECD report (referred to in Figure 
5) finds, “A large number of different cost allocations (and therefore prices) are 
consistent with the regulated firm recovering its costs.” And even if these challenges 
are overcome, cost-plus regulation has heavy information requirements, and is 
expensive to implement and monitor.  As is known, cost-based price regulation has also 
other problems, such as weak cost-reduction incentives (Section 3.1) and the tendency 
to evolve into convoluted regulatory schemes. 
Price regulation sometimes has perverse effects on the prices. As Armstrong (2014) 
recognizes, a binding price ceiling in some cases causes the average price to rise. 
Moreover, the two-sided nature of the broadband market complicates things. 
Regulating prices on one side may put upward pressure on prices on the other side 
(Vogelsang 2013). This phenomenon is called the waterbed effect or the “seesaw 
principle.” If termination fees are capped, subscription fees may rise in the retail 
market, unless those are regulated, as well, and would result in inefficiencies (Bourreau 
and Lestage 2013; Jullien and Sand-Zantman 2014). Inderst and Peitz (2012) find an 
analogous effect with access-price regulation. A simulation by Shapira (2004) would 
point to the opposite, predicting a higher consumer surplus higher in a price regulated, 
single product-line telecommunications industry than in free competition, which has 
the tendency to evolve into a natural monopoly. The same conclusion would apply to 
a regulation scheme where innovations of a monopoly firm are transferred (at a cost) 
to competing firms. 
In terms of implementation, a much simpler regulatory proposal than cost-plus 
regulation would be to enforce a uniform termination fee across CSPs, leaving the price 
  The Economic Effects of Network Neutrality 77 
otherwise unregulated. Uniform termination pricing would mitigate the problem of the 
ISP being able to discriminate CSPs, although Waterman (2012) notes that, 
analogously to the waterbed effect, a non-discrimination rule in the wholesale market 
might simply shift the ISP’s discriminatory behavior downstream into the retail market 
unless the retail side is regulated, as well. On the other hand, termination pricing need 
not have dubious motives behind it, as it can be justified as the first-best solution in 
mitigating the negative externality of congestion – prioritization, throttling, and data 
caps being second-best alternatives (Crocioni 2011). Uniform termination fees as such 
would not address the problem of inefficiency from the negative externality data-
intensive CSPs create. Hence, uniform termination pricing would probably work best 
in combination with network management. Continuing on the same line of reasoning, 
neutrality in the form of the zero-price rule is inefficient because it turns the network 
into a common resource, and the tragedy of the commons is not resolved as long as 
CSPs do not internalize the externality they create (Peitz and Schuett 2013). 
In principle, a straightforward form of regulation is to outlaw throttling and blocking. 
This sort of congestion-based regulation (as proposed in e.g. Frieden 2014) would be 
resource-consuming due to the information and reporting requirements; the regulator 
is required to monitor a multitude of technical parameters to ensure that prioritization 
always has a technical justification. As hinted in Section 2.2, drawing the line between 
network management and throttling is exceedingly difficult. 
A minimum-QoS standard, already in place in some EU countries such as Finland, is 
a middle-road regime that would prevent Internet fragmentation while leaving room 
for ISPs to offer differentiated broadband services, optimize their networks, and charge 
CSPs for congestion. Current regulation does not explicitly address whether or not the 
end user’s connection can be QoS- or access-tiered, but only specifies the required 
average QoS; the interpretation of the law seems somewhat unclear at the moment. To 
be effective, minimum-QoS regulation should cover both sides of the market so that 
each CSPs is provided a slow lane and each end user is provided a neutral slow lane at 
a minimum. (A guaranteed full-access slow lane on the supply side implies a neutral 
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slow lane on the demand side.) A minimum-QoS standard would not suppress 
innovation at the core to a significant degree, although setting the standard too high 
(as potentially pursued by industry incumbents with high-performance infrastructure 
in place) would further suppress ISP market entry (Brennan 2011). Setting the 
standard at an optimal level is the main challenge in implementing the policy. 
Based on the observations so far, we can conclude that not only is strong neutrality 
regulation cautioned against by economists but also middle-road regimes appear to 
cause difficulties. Cost-based ISP regulation may be inefficient, low-set price caps on 
either side of the market may have negative side effects, and congestion-based 
regulation may have severe implementation obstacles. Minimum-QoS regulation might 
provide one of the less bad compromises between effective regulation and costs of 
implementation. Given that regulatory intervention does not seem to lead to an optimal 
market design, is it possible for a market-driven equilibrium solution to emerge as an 
alternative? As has been established, this is unlikely due to the conflicting interests of 
the stakeholders. An opposing argument is presented by Knieps and Stocker (2014) 
who predict that weaker market-driven network management (NMZ and NMT 
regimes) built on the DiffServ architecture would be the deregulated outcome. This 
equilibrium would stem from the fact that “only a price and quality differentiation 
strategy based on the opportunity costs of traffic capacity usage can be stable.” Further, 
the authors argue that product differentiation based on DiffServ is economically 
efficient. It remains to be seen how DiffServ and other architectural developments of 
the Internet pan out on a large scale. 
While the ISP’s revenue scales with the long-run demand for connectivity, its capacity 
provisioning costs grow with the peak load on the network, as the ISP must 
overprovision and cannot let the network become too congested at any point (Joe-
Wong et al. 2013). This mismatch is a problem that can be alleviated by either 
throttling or more efficient pricing. Flat-rate pricing is suboptimal, leaving the 
timescale mismatch: The ISP’s revenue depends on fixed monthly fees, but capacity 
provisioning for peak-hour demand dominates its cost. With flat pricing, lighter users 
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in effect subsidize the bandwidth consumption of heavier users, who have little 
incentive to economize it (Liu 2004; Lyons 2013). 
ISPs have not so far partaken in pricing practices where the price of connectivity is 
based on network congestion or interconnection costs at a given moment, analogously 
to congestion pricing used with e.g. electricity distribution and toll roads. Instead, some 
ISPs’ answer to increased traffic volumes has been to start experimenting with monthly 
data caps and overage charges. This is close but not equivalent to pure usage-based 
pricing, which would target precisely the negative congestion externality, and therefore 
the reintroduction of data caps is not surprising. Somewhat surprising, though, is why 
full-blown usage-based pricing has yet to resurface. The reason might ultimately boil 
down to the stickiness of flat-fee traditions and marketing, predictability, and 
transparency considerations. Crucially, while usage-based pricing mitigates the 
congestion externality, it is still suboptimal: It does not address the timescale mismatch 
problem. Recall that the ISP’s costs are determined by peak consumption. In plain 
usage-based pricing, the unit price is independent of the congestion level at a given 
moment. Yet another pricing method would be needed to address this problem. 
A key market-driven possibility that might provide a compromise between economic 
efficiency and the abovementioned marketing concerns is dynamic pricing. Dynamic 
pricing, as opposed to discriminatory pricing, could give an out-of-the-box way to 
circumvent the neutrality question altogether. Perhaps the most elegant novel pricing 
method for the broadband market is time-dependent usage pricing (TDP), where the 
unit price depends on the time of the day (or day of the week etc.). TDP would induce 
heavier users to economize their bandwidth consumption and thus help reduce demand 
volatility and spread traffic more evenly over the day (Joe-Wong et al. 2013). 
Admittedly, while congestion correlates with the time of the day, TDP is strictly 
speaking a fundamentally “static” pricing model, as it is not directly based on the actual 
degree of congestion at a given moment (Liu 2004). On the other hand, TDP could be 
adequately convenient for the end user due to its predictability compared to real-time 
congestion-based pricing. At any rate, TDP would align the ISP’s and end users’ 
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interests and enable at least partial internalization of the negative network externality, 
as those who exert load on the network at the prime time would be the ones to 
compensate the ISP. Using simulations, Gupta et al. (2011) find congestion-based 
pricing generally socially beneficial compared to flat-rate pricing. 
It might be enough to use TDP in the retail market without network or price 
regulation. TDP already “punishes” data-intensive CSPs’ users and hence indirectly the 
CSPs according to the bandwidth their users demand at the most congested hours. 
Thus termination pricing would not be warranted. If worried about transparency or 
excess price fluctuations, the regulator might decide to limit the fluctuation ratio as it 
sees fit – a straightforward and easily enforceable rule. Dynamic pricing would have 
win-win potential from the neutrality-debate perspective, as it would not discriminate 
users as harshly based on their traffic profiles as flat-rate pricing does, and could reduce 
peak loads. (As noted earlier, while perhaps fair-sounding, flat pricing is actually 
discriminatory in an economic sense when lighter users are subjected to higher common 
subscription fees due to congestion costs caused by heavier users.) 
Therefore, dynamic pricing might perhaps be a realistically simple and effective market-
driven remedy to the neutrality problem. The appropriate policy action would then be 
to initiate discussion to encourage ISPs to devise dynamic rather than discriminatory 
pricing schemes. Cyclic pricing could be tolerated by the public, provided it is practiced 
in a sufficiently transparent manner. The skeptical reader might ponder whether ISPs 
would end up using TDP more for price-discrimination purposes than congestion 
avoidance. As Lyons (2013) emphasizes, while usage-based (or dynamic) pricing could 
be used in an anticompetitive manner, the specific pricing scheme in itself is not the 
main question as much as the degree of market power of ISPs, which can prove to be 
a problem in the neutral and non-neutral worlds alike. 
Qualitative reviews on the neutrality question tend to continue along the line of 
thought that allowing market-driven solutions and monitoring for potential abuses is 
the most flexible regulation model (e.g. Becker et al. 2010; Lyons 2013; Marsden 2007; 
Yoo 2006a, 2006b). In other words, it is quite widely maintained that ex-ante neutrality 
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regulation is not warranted, and an ex-post competition-policy approach remains a 
better regulatory regime. In the competition-policy context, the definition of the 
relevant market at both the demand and the supply side becomes an essential issue. 
Yoo (2006a) provides a key insight to this end: “[CSPs] care about the total number of 
users they can reach. So long as their total potential customer base is sufficiently large 
[…], the fact that a particular network owner may refuse carriage in any particular 
locality is of no consequence.” In other words, an ISP’s power over a CSP with respect 
to a subset of end users does not always restrict the CSP’s activity to a significant 
degree in relative terms. In this light, neutrality regulation seems less relevant in the 
case of a small ISP, at least from the CSP-innovation perspective. Further, relieving 
small ISPs of regulation, even if larger ISPs were more strictly regulated, would pave 
way for network diversity and competition. Indeed, competition policy generally targets 
the large players. 
In conclusion, Table 3 summarizes some of the economic arguments for and against 
network neutrality. 
Table 3. Economic arguments for and against network neutrality. 
Network Neutrality Network Non-Neutrality 
Higher theoretical CSP surplus (very likely) Higher theoretical ISP surplus (very likely) 
Higher theoretical consumer surplus (unlikely) Higher theoretical consumer surplus (likely) 
Higher theoretical total welfare (unlikely) Higher theoretical total welfare (likely) 
High ISP market power: More tools to abuse a 
dominant position under non-neutrality 
Neutrality does not rid ISPs of market power. 
Ex-post competition policy can be used to 
address abuse 
Internet infrastructure exhibits natural-
monopoly characteristics 
More incentives for ISPs to invest in 
infrastructure 
Vertical integration can increase ISPs’ market 
power and reduce competition among CSPs 
Vertical integration is often economically 
efficient 
Price discrimination can be welfare-reducing Price discrimination is often welfare-enhancing 
Market-driven solutions, e.g. dynamic or 
usage-based pricing, can emerge allowing ISPs 
to mitigate the congestion externality 
Economic efficiency from internalizing the 
congestion externality 
CSPs, especially small CSPs, likely to be 
harmed by non-neutrality. Discourages 
innovation at the edge 
Neutrality discourages innovation at the core, 
hindering the evolution of the Internet and 
preventing efficient network operation 
Termination pricing can hinder competition 
among CSPs and create barriers to entry Price regulation can cause a waterbed effect 
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Can limit ISP’s market power and increase 
competition in the market 
Can foster network diversity and increase 
competition in the market 
Strong neutrality straightforward to 
implement as an ex-ante rule 
Complexity of the market makes effective 
regulation difficult. Reporting and monitoring 
can be costly for ISPs and regulators 
Neutrality protects the diffusion of positive 
externalities on the Internet. Threat of 
fragmentation under non-neutrality 
Title II-type regulation can lead to potentially 
inefficient government intervention and 
taxation 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I have analyzed the economics and regulation of the broadband market 
through the lens of the so-called network-neutrality debate. I have discussed the 
characteristics, developments, and models of the market. Further, I have evaluated the 
qualitative economic effects of network neutrality and alternative regulatory regimes. 
To sum up, my analysis suggests that while the broadband industry exhibits 
characteristics comparable to those of more regulated industries, such as the electricity 
distribution market, the complexity of the Internet ecosystem differentiates the 
industry from many others. This complexity does not stem merely from the physical 
layouts of the networks but from the business relations between market participants, 
and makes effective regulation difficult. Models from economic theory give mixed 
results on the welfare effects of network neutrality. There is no economic evidence that 
network neutrality generally increases total welfare. In fact, it turns out that from a 
well-rounded economic perspective, strong network neutrality appears in most cases as 
detrimental to both consumer surplus and total welfare. In certain scenarios, however, 
models predict that neutrality to a degree increases static and dynamic efficiency. The 
results depend crucially on model specifications and parameters, which differ 
significantly across the literature. So far, there is no consensus among economists on 
the optimal level of ISP regulation. Market-driven solutions such as dynamic pricing 
might provide a way to circumvent the neutrality question. 
At this point, I should make a couple of concluding remarks about the limitations in 
my analysis. First, not all of the subject matter has been previously covered in the 
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literature as far as I am aware, and a certain amount of exploration, anecdotal evidence, 
and common sense is involved. Second, I have discarded the possibility of regulating 
the membership fees CSPs can charge end users. This would be questionable and have 
many ramifications. Third, I have not considered policies where the subscription fee is 
regulated but termination fee deregulated, as these sound unrealistic under current 
legislative developments that revolve around data discrimination and termination 
pricing rather than purely retail price regulation. Were these included, we would have 
an additional column in Table 1. Fourth, I have not considered simply nationalizing 
the principal data routes or municipalizing residential access ISPs, which has also been 
proposed.55 (Municipal Internet provision alongside private ISPs could, however, be 
economically sustainable, as concluded in Hauge et al. [2008].) Finally, I have not 
ventured far into the realm of possible ISP regulation policies unrelated to network 
neutrality. Following Claffy and Clark (2014), different levels of “structural separation” 
or “open interfacing” (conceptually related to unbundling) at different layers of the 
Internet ecosystem provide particularly interesting possibilities for future exploration. 
The neutrality debate is not merely about technical pedantry but has ramifications for 
our information society at large. The recent and upcoming regulatory decisions will 
reverberate through the entire ecosystem, affecting both the random surfer and the 
society. They are, however, unlikely to be enough to settle the accounts; the debate is 
likely go on for a long time. In the end, I believe regulation ought to be looked at more 
from a pragmatic cost-benefit analysis perspective than as a purely ethical principle. 
The complexity of the broadband market makes not only regulation but also modeling 
highly difficult. Nevertheless, the astonishing diversity of Internet content and services 
calls for models that try to capture more of this heterogeneity. Fortunately, if the trend 
of the last year or two continues, we are going to see more research about network 
neutrality in the near future. More generally, there is still a lot to study about the 
economics of the broadband market. In particular, the interconnection market is 
something most models have abstracted away. What I would find meaningful are still 
                                    
55 See e.g. www.nytimes.com. Accessed 27 Dec 2014. 
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more complete models of the broadband market that see the forest for the trees, for 
these lay the foundation for successful policy analysis and decision-making. Now is the 
time to contribute to what the future of the Internet will look like.  
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Appendix: Acronyms 
AC = Average cost 
BEREC = Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
CDN = Content delivery network, content distribution network 
CNP = Content network platform 
CSP = Content/service provider 
DDR = Data discrimination with price regulation 
DDZ = Data discrimination with the zero-price rule 
DiffServ = Differentiated services 
DPI = Deep packet inspection 
DSL = Digital subscriber line; xDSL: Umbrella for DSL technologies 
ECPR = Efficient component pricing rule 
FCC = Federal Communications Commission 
FICORA = Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority 
FIFO = First-in-first-out 
FTTH = Fiber-to-the-home; FTTx = Fiber-to-the-x: Umbrella for fiber local-loop technologies 
GB = Gigabyte; Gbps = Gigabits per second 
GSM = Global System for Mobile Communications 
HTTP = Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
IP = Internet Protocol 
IRU = Indefeasible right to use 
ISP = Internet service provider 
IXP = Internet exchange point 
LTE-A = LTE Advanced; LTE = Long-Term Evolution 
MB = Megabyte; Mbit = Megabit; Mbps = Megabits per second 
MC = Marginal cost 
NMR = Network management with price regulation 
NMT = Network management with two-sided pricing 
NMZ = Network management with the zero-price rule 
NN = Network neutrality 
NNN = Network non-neutrality 
NR = Network regulation 
NRT = Network regulation with two-sided pricing 
P2P = Peer-to-peer 
PoP = Point of presence 
PPP = Purchasing power parity 
QoS = Quality of service 
SLA = Service-level agreement 
SPE = Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
TC = Total cost 
TCP = Transmission Control Protocol 
TDP = Time-dependent usage pricing 
TSP = Telecommunications service provider 
VoIP = Voice-over-IP 
WWW = World Wide Web 
